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hot spots world-wide on peacekeeping and combat missions which require extra
flexibility to adapt to diverse terrain, weather and threat conditions. A sophisticated
sensor suite integrated with weapon systems will guarantee battlefield dominance and
vehicle survivability can be enhanced with revolutionary composite armor. Hybrid
electric drive will mainly enhance survivability, fuel economy, stealth, operational
capability and acceleration performance. Power electronics developments will speed up
the transformation from conventional gas engines to hybrid armored vehicle drive
systems. This thesis presents a combat system integration process for an Iguana based
armored vehicle. It lays out steps to be taken in conceiving and developing the armored
vehicle starting from the Mission Need Statement. Scenarios are used to create a context
within which to define realistic operational requirements. Functional flow modeling for
the interoperable reconnaissance, forward observer and anti-guerrilla version armored
vehicles provides the analytical basis for defining subsystem characteristics. A
particularly important operational need is for night vision sensors. The U.S. Army Night
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are used to establish feasible Iguana™ thermal night vision device performance
requirements.




n. MISSION NEED STATEMENT 7
m. SCENARIOS 15
IV. FUNCTIONAL FLOWS 23
V. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 35
VI. THE APPLICATION OF COMPOSITE MATERIALS IN ARMORED
VEHICLE DESIGN 55
VE. HYBRID DRIVE SYSTEMS FOR THE ARMORED VEHICLE 59
VHI. COMPARISION OF POSSIBLE ELECTRIC DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENTS FOR ARMORED VEHICLES 65
DC MOBILITY ANALYSIS 69
X. SECOND GENERATION THERMAL IMAGING DEVICE
PERFORMANCE TEST.... 79
XI. CONCLUSIONS 87
LIST OF REFERENCES 95
APPENDIX A . FLIR92 AND ACQUIRE INPUT AND OUTPUT FILES 97
APPENDDCB. IGUANA™ PERFORMANCE TEST PLAN 107
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 109
vn
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Vlll
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe special thanks to my thesis co-advisors, Professor Michael Melich and
Professor Robert C. Harney, for their encouragement, guidance, and support throughout
the preparation of this thesis. As a tank officer, I especially appreciate the armored
vehicle related thesis opportunity afforded me at the Naval Postgraduate School. I would
also like to thank Professor John G. Ciezki for providing me the power electronics
knowledge and data to complete the related chapter.
IX
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
This thesis includes a combat system design study for Iguana™ armored vehicle
family. The Iguana™ concept, which was invented and patented (United States Patent
number: 5,318,141, June 7, 1994) by David W. Hansen, was reduced to practice in a
7,500 pound tracked vehicle with a maximum payload weight of 2,000 pounds. The
National Automotive Center of U.S. Army's Tank and Automotive Command in
cooperation with the Naval Research Laboratory contracted in April 1996 to have a
Model Iguana™ (Figure 1) constructed. Model was first demonstrated in October
1996. It was designed to use readily available components and was operational within 5
months of start of construction. Among the features demonstrated were the abilities to:
• Carry a payload of at least 2,000 pounds
• Climb over obstacles up to 1.8 m in height
• Operate on paved highways without damage to the road or The Iguana™'s
tracks
• Operate in mixed snow, rain and mud conditions without destroying the road
• Climb or otherwise traverse embankments or hillsides of up to 45 degrees
slope
• Traverse across a 30 degree slope without losing tracks
• Demonstrate ability to self-load and unload onto a truck bed at least 1 meter
high
• Operate as an amphibian
• Operate in sand, mud, river banks, foliage and other environments where
wheeled vehicles would become stuck
• Perform all of the above without modification to the basic vehicle, e.g.,
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Figure 1 . The prototype Model IguanaTM
,TMThe Iguana represents a major advance in the design of the suspension system
for tracked vehicles. It achieves its performance through the use of a combination of
features in the track tensioning system and the design of the tracks themselves.
Consequently, the Iguana doesn't suffer from the limitation found in most other tracked
vehicles with respect to cross-hill mobility. Most tracked vehicles can only traverse hills
with no more that 20-30% grade otherwise they slide out of their tracks. The Iguana
Model has been demonstrated to hold its track while traversing hillsides of 60% grade.
The Iguana™ armored vehicle family described in this thesis makes use of other new
technologies such as composite armor and hybrid electric drive to overcome deficiencies
found in current armored vehicles. We also introduce a higher level of combat system
and vehicle integration than is currently achieved in most armored vehicles.
The combat system design of a new combatant, such as an armored vehicle,
fighter plane or arsenal ship, always requires a breadth and depth of engineering
knowledge to create a world-class-integrated warfare system. Before solving the
problem, the definition and boundaries of the problem must be set up. A Mission Needs
Statement (MNS), as used in the U.S. Department of Defense acquisition system
procedures for creating new capabilities, is the first step in understanding why we need a
new combatant vehicle as opposed to making modifications to current systems (potential
material alternatives) or changes in doctrine, tactics, training and organization changes
(non-material alternatives). Financial, political and other possible constraints must also
be explored and made explicit in the mission definition phase. The Mission Needs
Statement generally states the basic operational capability for the combatant and provides
rough information about the mission and threat environment.
The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) is contract between the
operational community and the design community. It guides the system engineers and
designers in their creation of a system that meets the desired performance criteria. The
ORD evolves from the MNS through much analysis of the threat, natural environment,
missions, cost, producibility, availability of technology, and other factors that influence
the creation of a new combatant. This analysis is done well only when all parties to the
"ORD contract" participate in its creation. Thus a complex system requirement, as
expressed in a successful ORD, will have considered the limitations of physics and the
operational desirability of various features of the required system. Most of the
requirements analyses make use of scenarios that visualize realistic combat conditions.
Functional flows detailed in chapter in also elaborate on the nature of the requirements
listed in the ORD and provide a record for the rationale for the different versions of
Iguana™s. Each version is able to perform a subset of the missions of the Iguana™
family. From each of these partial missions, subordinate duties are extracted and these are
then further decomposed into the actual tasks that specific components will be designed
to perform. For example, tasks or functions can be allocated to the building blocks of
systems, namely hardware, computer programs and people. Assemblages of these
building blocks in the detection subsystem of the Iguana™ reconnaissance version might
envision an infrared detector, a signal processor with averaging done by computer codes
and an operator that detects and interprets the image as being a particular kind of tank. It
is not surprising that there are generally many design solutions to each task rather than a
unique recipe. After constructing a detailed spreadsheet of duties/tasks and design
solution alternatives, the system engineering process is called upon to do trade-offs since
seldom is there an obvious optimality problem to solve. However, whenever possible the
creation of optimality criteria permits the application of optimization techniques widely
applied by the practitioners of operations research. Simulations and performance tests in
virtual battlefield environments are becoming available and significantly facilitate the
system analyses for the engineering and manufacturing development processes. Life
cycle operational support, modular design for future modifications, interoperability with
other force units, integration into the digitized battlefield, timelines for system synthesis
and disposal plans are also involved in an Iguana™ master plan which guides the
development.
B. PRINCIPLE CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis serves as a first development step in the design of an innovative
armored vehicle combat system. It defines the missions that Iguana™ is to handle in a
future dynamic threat environment facing a new global armored force deployment in a
stipulated set of operational conditions. The Iguana™ Mission Needs Statement
emphasizes the deficiencies of current systems and calls for alternative solution
approaches, recognizes specific development constraints, outlines expected tactical usage
of the Iguana™1 , and roughly describes the required main subsystem characteristics. The
Operational Requirements Document is synthesized from analyses of tactical needs and
the technically possible capabilities. Both of these documents were generated by the
author after conducting the required analyses and having numerous discussions with his
advisors. The detailed information on subsystems was obtained from technical and
tactical defense periodicals and companies, such as PEI Electronics Inc. for hybrid
electric drives, ATAK Inc. for composite armor, and Unique Mobility Inc. for power
electronics. The Iguana™1 thermal imaging device parameters were developed through
analysis to answer the Operational Requirements Document demands by using U.S.
Army Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate's FLIR92 and ACQUIRE thermal
imaging device performance test computer programs. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) and Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering
Center (TARDEC) projections for future armored vehicles are also mentioned in this
thesis.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapters II-V of this thesis focus on the Iguana™ mission and operation analyses
while the following chapters VI-X explain some required Iguana™ combat system
features in detail. This thesis begins with the author's Mission Needs Statement for an
Iguana™ armored vehicle family. Scenarios and functional flows are developed to aid in
the visualization of expected operations in various threat environments. From these
visualizations, the role played by the Iguana™ combatant is derived and the implied
requirements for the system are recorded. Next, the Operational Requirements Document
describes the specific subsystem characteristics that fulfill the missions consistent with
the requirements derived from the scenarios and functional flow analyses. Note in the
Defense Department Directives (DOD 5000 series) for the development of new systems
that an acceptance test plan is a recognized, useful way, and effective way to clarify what
is being required of a new system. The subsystem's analyses and test plans on the armor,
drive system, power electronics and thermal imaging device provide enough information
for a detailed comparison among the alternative solution concepts. For example, FLIR92
and ACQUIRE programs significantly refine and balance the thermal imaging device
components to avoid unbalanced performance demands on individual parts while yielding
satisfactory system level performance. The examined composite armor technology, if
applied, provides numerous tactical and survival advantages for its future operations of
armored vehicles. Power electronics is evolving so rapidly that the hybrid electric drive
has become feasible for incorporation in armored vehicles today.
II. IGUANA™ ARMORED VEHICLE FAMILY MISSION NEEDS
STATEMENT
Terrain and weather conditions directly affect situational awareness and mobility
performance in combat missions. Rugged, muddy, snow-covered, and sandy ground
conditions have negative effects on the mobility of wheeled or tracked vehicles. Rivers,
artificial obstacles, steep ramps, swamps, minefields, water canals also restrict the
avenues for advance. Fog, rain, snow, drizzle, dust, long distance and other day/night
vision handicaps aggravate the detection capabilities of the electronic sensors, sights, and
eyes. A fighting vehicle that overcomes these terrain and weather obstacles is crucial for
modern battlefield operations.
Today, reconnaissance, anti-guerrilla, rapid deployment, border security, UN
peacekeeping, forward observer missions are commonly executed in these diverse terrain
and weather conditions. Threatening innovative lethal technologies press to the fore the
combatant survival concerns whether in conventional or irregular warfare environments.
Stealthy vehicle configurations that combine low IR and acoustic signatures, minimum
radar cross section, and camouflage are now as important as effective armor ever was.
Threat warning systems and active countermeasures should also make contributions to
battlefield survivability.
The irreversible trend of battlefield digitalization, i. e., the introduction of digital
networks tying all elements of a force together, will revolutionize command and control
of armies, place great demands on wireless communication systems, and place further
pressure for timely and accurate information from intelligence processes. Electronic
warfare and countermeasures will follow a parallel improvement. Cutting edge
information technology applied to information warfare will lead us to the tactical Internet
as a critical combat element in the very near future. Navigation, fire control system,
optoelectronics, secure data, image, and voice transfer systems already depend on digital
technology.
Strategic mobility considerations increasingly demand rapid force deployment.
The operational capabilities of vehicles must suffice on different terrain and in varied
weather conditions as well as against various hostile threats. So the combatant must have
the ability to deploy/respond quickly and operate with sufficient tactical flexibility,
whenever and wherever required, to enable wide range operations. Self-contained
sustainability without access to support and maintenance facilities during periods of
extended deployed operations enable the desired ability to operate independently.
The basic vehicle configuration must have the flexibility to adapt to changes in
the threats, missions, and technologies. It must be an affordable solution, that is, it must
be at a cost which is in balance with competing budgetary demands. The design,
conceived as an independently operational combatant, also provides great flexibility in
the force structure in the face of changing tactical needs.
When we scrutinize the operational features of this kind of combatant, it can be
easily discerned that this vehicle includes many familiar characteristics of the envisioned
future scout, forward observer and anti-guerrilla fighting vehicles. The standardization of
the vehicle has the potential to reduce the research and development (R&D),
procurement, maintenance, and training costs, while increasing interoperability. These
different versions of the Iguana™ vehicles should be easily obtained by changing some
vehicular parameters and subsystems on the same chassis.
The adaptation of new tactics and organization structures to the characteristics of
the new combatant will help to meet some of the operational needs. The formation of
rapid deployment forces and an increase in the number of the anti-guerrilla units using
these combatants are examples of organizational options to be considered. The creation
of new tactics is a dynamic process that reflects the interplay of new threats, changing
missions, and new operational settings. The design of a new combatant with a new set of
capabilities and changed performance can enhance the integrity of operational solutions
and lead to the new tactics and further structural changes.
Current combatants do not solve operational problems described above for the
following reasons:
1. Lack of Integration of vehicle and combat system: Even if some alternative
vehicles show partial success on these missions, the need for an integrated operational
war fighting system is inevitable. The use of existing vehicles creates many coordination
problems with a consequent increase in reaction time. For instance, the transportation
and power requirements of ground radars limit it to usage as an independent system. In
contrast, if the reconnaissance vehicles were equipped with precise weapons and had
integrated detection equipment, they could perform efficiently find-and-destroy missions.
2. Limited Mobility: The playground of irregular forces is frequently on rough,
swampy, jungle or desert types of terrain. The common features of these environments
are they obstruct or slow forward motion of wheeled vehicles and degrade tracked
vehicle mobility. Swamps, rivers, and small lakes generate a need for amphibious
capabilities. Sometimes tanks can also have mobility failures on steep ramps or on
muddy, frozen and rocky terrain. This set of circumstances with existing vehicles begs
for reducing the pressure on the ground, increasing the efficiency in terms of power to
weight and power to volume ratios all the while seeking additional endurance or reduced
fuel consumption per mission.
3. Inadequate Performance and Integration of Combat System Components:
Future armored vehicles must possess superior target acquisition capabilities which
exploit information/intelligence awareness, and advanced fire control, while anticipating
the need to do these missions with a reduction in manpower. Technology exists to
accomplish this, such as, spoken human-machine dialogue/commands to accelerate
information flow and the target acquisition process. Future armored vehicles must have a
combat system which enables engagements while either moving or stationary, this
includes detecting and identifying threat forces at extended ranges and proceeding
through fire control to engagement and damage assessment. Targets include personnel,
bunkers, light and heavily armored vehicles, and rotary and fixed wing aircraft. Targets
must be rapidly detected, recognized by type, and identified as friend or foe without the
target knowledge, at ranges beyond the threat's ability to counter-detect own combatant.
Countermeasures or environmental conditions (such as weather, day/night, or the most
cluttered battlefield) must not disable these capabilities. Specialized reconnaissance units
will require higher resolution target acquisition to support the extended ranges
encountered in their operations. Sensor suites at every level will be critical to the target
acquisition process and must provide real time information to commanders for immediate
decisions on a fluid battlefield using available communication systems. Sensors must
have the capability to allow for the use of remotely operated weapon systems with
sufficient resolution and low false alarm rates for both detection and identification.
10
Enhanced target acquisition is critical to the force's ability to positively detect, track,
engage, and kill targets despite the most cluttered battlefield or sophisticated camouflage
systems.
4. Border Control Inadequacies of Current Combat Systems: Infiltration is a
serious problem on the Israeli-Lebanon and Turkish-Iraqi borders. The border outposts
are susceptible to surprise guerrilla raids from the surrounding rough terrain that prevents
effective hot-pursuit operations. The increasing number of casualties proves the need for
better systems to cope with these guerrilla raids and infiltration. The drug smugglers and
refugee movements across the US-Mexican border demonstrate a new dimension on the
border control problem. UN peacekeeping operations such as in Bosnia and Cyprus
require mobile observation teams to detect violations, classify them as to type and
determine responsibility all in a timely way.
5. Impacts of Mines on Mobility: Improving mine technology poses a serious
threat to current fighting vehicles. Mines limit mobility, create nuisances and delays for
the advancing units and inflict casualties without close engagement with the enemy
forces. Thus, there is an urgent need for active and passive counter measures against the
mine threat. One possible countermeasure is to increase the amount of terrain that can be
traversed by the combat vehicles. This forces the mining forces to distribute larger
quantities of mines in increasingly hostile physical settings.
6. The Combatant Signature Vulnerability: The opponents' warning systems
exploit our current combatant's ER. signature, acoustic signature and radar cross section of
which exposes an acute vulnerability that reduces combatant survivability. The
immediate effect of this to reexamine the source of these signatures and determine if
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means exist to combatants detectability. Basic power requirements must revised to meet
new agility standards and payload demands while reducing vulnerabilities. Similarly
armor protection specifications must be reconsidered and traded-off against active
protection measures due to new threats such as smart top attack weapons, and the need
for reduced radar cross section.
7. New Deep Attack Missions: The modern battle line shows a distinct nonlinear
character. Extensive tactical deep attacks or scout missions will be executed in the
enemy rear regions. These kinds of operations need an agile and long-range vehicle for
operations in widely diverse terrain. Superior battlefield surveillance capacity in the
attack forces will increase the efficiency of the tactical deep attacks thus making them a
preferred mode of operation.
8. In low intensity anti-guerrilla operations Iguana™ is employed in the area
domination, border patrol, route protection, convoy escort, hot pursuit, and show-of-force
exercises without the terrain limitations.
9. The user-friendly design of new combatant will facilitate crew training and
increase their actual operational performance. It also will minimize the crew size without
impairing the performance of assigned functions.
10. Future armored vehicles must possess overmatching lethality against all
projected threat systems. This includes improved probabilities of hitting and killing
heavily protected systems while either stationary, moving, or maneuvering, in all
environments (to include natural and man-made obscurants, clutter, darkness, and poor
weather), at extended ranges. The capability to automatically detect, identify, track, and
assess damage against targets will improve combat system lethality. The new combatant
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must be able to defeat emerging threat protective systems that may include advanced
reactive and/or passive armors, signature management, electronic countermeasures, or
active protection systems. Inherent within this capability requirement is the need to
destroy targets within and beyond firing vehicle line of sight, directed by cueing from on-
board or off-board sources. Similarly, systems must have the capability to designate
targets for servicing by other firing combatants. Also, combat system lethality must be
more efficient in terms of reduced ammunition requirements (fewer rounds required per
kill) and reduced crew interaction requirements (workload).
11. Despite the availability of all-seeing long-range battlefield sensors that are
mounted in unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, or aerial platforms; ground
scouting is still necessary for mounting continuous operations. Ground scouts can
operate in all weather conditions; are unaffected by air defenses; can exercise on-site
human judgment; can directly retrieve objects; and can complement airborne sensors by
operating in areas obscured from aerial observation by terrain, foliage, or camouflage.
[Ref. 1]
12. For most major armies, the focus of force development in the coming decade
is the attainment of information dominance through implementation of information
operations and exploitation of information technology. Reconnaissance vehicles,
furnished with human-intelligence sources, will still play a critical role in the




A. HEZBOLLAH AND ISRAELI SECURITY ZONE - SOUTH LEBANON
From a military standpoint, the terrain in South Lebanon seems totally unsuited for
armored warfare. It favors the defender, with its rugged, hilly countryside. Rock-
covered basalt hills with steep ravines make cross-country movement, even with tanks,
extremely difficult, and in most cases armored vehicles are road- or track-bound. As the
ridges normally run from east to west, movement is geared through the wadis, between
the ridges. These are passable only in part and, with their steep canyon-like walls, make
formidable obstacles. Most of the region is pocked with thick shrubs, providing excellent
hiding places for tank-hunter teams and ambushes that are very difficult to detect before
they are executed. Furthermore, the area is filled with hundreds of small villages, mostly
situated on the high ground, from which guerrilla fighters can mount their surprise attacks
and swiftly return to good hiding places amongst the mostly friendly Shiite population.
The Israelis in the so-called Security Zone in South Lebanon have implemented a
series of strongpoints located widely apart and not always capable of rendering mutual
fire support. One of the most difficult tasks is to maintain lines of communications to
and from those strongpoints and the supply depots on the Israeli border. As most of the
roads are winding narrow tracks, they provide the attackers with easy access to ambush
sites, where they emplace explosive charges and mount rocket attacks on the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) traffic. Most of the costly IDF losses have been caused by such
ambushes, and considerable effort is necessary in order to maintain open supply routes to
the strongpoints. [Ref. 2]
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Time: 16 30 (local) - July 13, 1999
After Middle East Peace Process negotiations lost their momentum and Israel
insisted on retaining the security zone in South Lebanon, Iran and Syria increased their
support to Hezbollah by supplying TOW, Sagger and Spigot guided anti-tank missiles.
Because of heavy casualties on marching patrols and lightly armored wheeled vehicles
inflicted by remotely controlled road-side explosive charges and rocket attacks, the
supply convoys and patrol missions between strongpoints were modified so they are now
executed with the support of armored vehicles like tanks, armored personnel carriers
(APCs), and Iguana™ armored vehicles. Losing two Merkava tanks due to the anti-tank
guided missile (ATGM) team ambushes in the last years is an indication of the increasing
Hezbollah capacity in addition to Sagger and AT-4 Spigot ATGM's.
In a seemingly routine patrol mission in South Lebanon with forces consisting of
two Merkavas, two Iguana™ armored combatants, and one infantry platoon with APCs,
everything looks like normal until the leading tank shudders with the explosion of anti-
tank mine. The second tank commander, who is also patrol commander, notices that
there is only damage on the other tank's one track in spite of the great impact. While he
orders the other vehicles to occupy suitable positions to search for other nasty surprises,
he evaluates the terrain and tactical situation. Finally he begins to report the incident and
he asks for a recovery vehicle for the immobilized tank and aerial reconnaissance of the
area for guerrilla activities. During this standard procedure, one of the Iguana™
combatant commanders suddenly gives an anti-tank missile launch warning on the radio
net. The patrol commander pops up his head from the hatch to understand the situation
while he orders his driver to execute rapid evasive maneuvers. The crippled tank and
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Iguana™ combatant that spotted the missile launch site open fire and launch smoke
mortar rounds in the direction of the missile launcher, hoping to disturb the guerrilla
gunner's concentration during the critical navigation phase, or obscure his vision by
smoke. The impact of the missile is neutralized by reactive armor but the patrol
commander on the hatch is not as lucky as his tank. As the infantry platoon commander
takes over the command, the first impacts of mortar rounds herald that they are under an
organized attack. One of the Iguana™s passes the information about suspected
movements on a nearby hill covered with thick shrubs before the start of heavy rocket
and machine gun fire. They are probably the covering element of the ATGM team. The
infantry platoon commander decides to attack the hill with support of tank fires by
leaving mortar fire impact area while two Iguana™s head for missile launch site on the
rough terrain. Iguana™s detect and destroy the ATGM team that tries to reposition for
the crippled tank. One of the Iguana™s is able to locate the mortar position with its
sensors and pass this data to the supporting artillery unit. The Iguana™ gives necessary
corrections on the radio after observing the first artillery round impacts. The sound of
approaching attack helicopters finally means the start of the pursuit operation.
B. PKK AND TURKISH-IRAQI BORDER - CUKURCA
The Turkish-Iraqi borderline has a generally mountainous character. The terrain
is rugged and traffic is strictly road-bound. Steep rocked hills, ravines, and small forests
along the valleys are common. Severe and erratic climate conditions also are the main
operational handicaps especially in winter (snow storms, avalanches, heavy showers).
After the Gulf War, the Northern Iraqi Security Zone was created by allied forces in order
to protect local population, but continuous skirmishes between rival Kurdish groups
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turned the area into an authority vacuum. PKK guerrilla organization made use of these
suitable conditions by launching attacks against Turkish security forces from this area.
This region is also used for guerrilla logistic and training centers. The infiltration of
guerrilla groups to the inner parts of country from this area is always an anxiety for
Turkish commanders.
Time: 22 30 (local) - October 28, 1999
According to intelligence reports and unmanned air vehicle (UAV)
reconnaissance, a group of guerrilla has approached the Turkish-Iraqi border and is
waiting for a convenient infiltration time to cross the border. The possibility that the
infiltrators are carrying surface to air missiles (SAMs) missiles increases the importance
of inactivating this group. Erratic weather conditions worsen the possibility of detecting
this group. Five or six known trespassing sites are set up for ambush by mobile infantry
units with the support of Iguana™s. Several distracting assaults or mortar nuisance fire
are expected from the infiltrators to disguise the main infiltration body.
The Iguana™ sensor operator briefly detects some signatures at 4 km but because
the terrain is hilly he doesn't have a long exposure opportunity. He passes this
intelligence to the other ambush elements and to the tactical operation center
simultaneously. One Iguana™ is ordered to change position under the cover of noise
from the rain and thunder. In this new position, it can easily view the approaching routes,
which are normally out of sight. After 20 minutes, the repositioned Iguana™ 's sensors
detect and locate the approaching column at 3 km. Some of the ambush teams are
channelized to new positions to block the advance of the approaching column. The
tactical operations center asks several Iguanas to check the security of certain deep
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landing zones in Northern Iraq with their long-range sensors. Air assault troops, who will
encircle the guerrilla group when the engagement starts, are going to be dropped in these
zones. One Iguana™ passes an alerting message that there is a herd of wild animals at a
location nearby the ambush teams (who need to avoid making a mistake of thinking it is
the infiltrators). An ambushing team is also notified that it is in an incorrect position and
needs to reposition. When the forward elements of the guerrilla column finally fall into
the ambush, Iguana™s begin to fire at the crowded guerrilla spots with tracer bullets in
order to lead the ambush fire onto them. When the air assault operation starts, guerrilla
column begin to split up into small groups and try to leave the ambush site. Iguana™s
also continue to correct artillery, mortar and attack helicopter fire on the withdrawing
guerrilla elements. A friendly team reports that they are engaging with the guerrillas at a
very close distance on the rough terrain and have several wounded personnel. Further
they report that they can't evacuate them immediately because of heavy fire. Two of the
Iguana™s are sent to this spot to relieve pressure on this team and help them to overcome
the guerrilla resistance. The usage of other fire support elements is considered to be too
risky for the relief of this closely engaged team due to possibilities of fratricide. The
systematic effort at the cat-and-mouse game lasts until dawn. At dawn, the operation
area is searched carefully by mobile teams while Iguana™s stay alert and scan the
operation area from the dominating high ground positions.
C. TURKISH-GREEK WAR - MERIC RIVER, THRACE
At the beginning of September, the Meric River, which constitutes the Turkish-
Greek border, reaches its shallowest level. The Greek side of the river near the Aegean
Sea is largely a swamp. This area is also fortified with wide water canals parallel to the
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river in order to increase the defensive capacity of the terrain. The area is partially
covered with small forests and thick shrubs. After rain showers, the muddy characteristic
of the ground aggravates the cross-country movement capacity of tracked vehicles.
During September, the weather conditions change erratically.
Time: 05 00 (local) - September 11, 1999
The political deterioration between Greece and Turkey leads the Greek
government to a limited war with Turkey in order to prevent Turkish European
Community membership and expose the Cyprus problem globally. During a Greek-
South Cyprus joint exercise, a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft is shot down with a SAM
missile over Cyprus. Dogfights over Cyprus rapidly extend to the Aegean Sea.
However, the initiation of air strikes and naval engagements indicates that the current
situation quickly may be transformed into a general war. While the Turkish Army uses
the forward artillery observer version of Iguana s, the Hellenic Army has Iguana 's
reconnaissance version in its inventory.
The tank battalion forward observers are positioned at the riverbank in order to
detect the latest Greek deployments across the river for the oncoming Turkish fording
operation near Enez town. They are generally able to locate the front line defensive
positions and the supply roads perpendicular to the river by using long range sensors.
This intelligence is passed to the tactical operation center of the tank battalion. This will
enable the selection of the fording places and the routes of the tank battalion will be
chosen to avoid hitting anti-tank minefields and other obstacles. Across the river, the
Greek reconnaissance company tries to locate the center of the Turkish tactical
deployment and to predict the exact fording sites.
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The start of an intense Turkish artillery barrage indicates the beginning of the
expected fording operation in the foggy morning. The tank battalion's mission is to
secure the bridgehead and to give the combat engineers the opportunity for setting up a
pontoon bridge across the Meric River. The tank battalion equipped with snorkels begins
to cross the Meric River with Iguana™s throwing back the Greek front-line resistance.
Heavy losses are incurred during the fording. The mission of the Greek reconnaissance
company is to protect the withdrawal of the front-line elements to the next defensive line
and to maintain contact with the advancing Turkish forces in order to provide tactical
intelligence about them. Their superiority mobility makes it easy for them to withdraw
from the swampy land and the wide water canals. The ability to fire at the oncoming
Turkish force during its floating time is another positive factor for them. A Turkish
Iguana™ detects low-level attack helicopters approaching and warns the tank companies
and stinger teams. The tank commanders and attack helicopter pilots are strictly
instructed to check the identification before firing on any Iguana™, because both sides
have the same vehicle in their inventory. A Greek Iguana™ is alerted by its laser
warning system. This means that a tank has ranged its distance before firing or a laser
designator is guiding a laser guided missile toward it. It escapes from the danger by
using active protection measures and making a sudden turn. Losses are heavy on both
sides, but not catastrophic. Fortunately, NATO's intercession efforts are successful and a




A. THE RECONNAISSANCE VERSION OF IGUANA™
1 . March to the Operation Area
a) Receive orders to conduct a reconnaissance mission and the intelligence about
the operating area. Analyze the orders and do initial planning for operation, which
involves:
* becoming familiar with the maps of the operating area and load them into
vehicle's database
* updating the intelligence database
* defining the interface requirements with friendly forces
* conducting a "rehearsal" using a digital simulation of the operating area and
threat forces
b) Load all consumables (fuel, ammunition, provision etc.) while in the assembly
area for a logistics-free operation
* use maximum payload capacity to extend operational endurance
* arrange the storage sites to increase useable internal volume
* modify the modular hardware of the vehicle for a particular mission
c) Conduct fire control system readiness tests and hardware maintenance checks
(radios, automatic fire extinguishers, weapons etc.)
d) March through the friendly forces to operating area
* plan the marching route and navigate to the initial location
e) Recover crippled vehicles
f) Coordinate with foremost elements about the enemy situation
* update the intelligence database
* communicate face-to-face with the responsible commander who is directly
in contact with enemy
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2. Update the Plan
a) Observe the operating area to get more information
* select a convenient position for the observation of the operating area before
starting the oncoming operation
* use your long-range sensors and consolidate the other intelligence gathering
elements' efforts
* execute counter-reconnaissance functions
b) Identify the critical parts of terrain and select preferred avenues of advance
c) Identify routes for sneaking through enemy lines
d) Get and evaluate the weather report for the time period of the operations
3. Execute the Reconnaissance Mission
a) Navigate according to the planned routes
* check your position and direction regularly
b) Take actions to try to reduce your vehicle's signatures
* make use of terrain, weather conditions and vehicle aspects to reduce the
visible, IR, acoustic, radar and seismic signatures of the vehicle
c) Choose successive hiding and observation positions and use camouflage
d) Maintain tight security around the vehicle
e) Move between preselected successive positions rapidly and stealthily
f) Pass through/over or bypass obstacles
* detect the obstacles
* bypass them if possible
* pass them with appropriate approaching technique
g) Ford the rivers or artificial water canals
h) Protect the crew from mines and maintain vehicle mobility
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* try to detect minefields and bypass or breach them
i) Provide air-conditioned operating ambience and protect the crew from the
NBC threat
* detect contaminated areas and bypass them
* ingest the air from outside and filter it for crew use
* isolate the crew compartment against any infiltration
* provide the air-conditioned operating ambience
j) Detect and identify any weapons designator threat playing on the vehicle and
take countermeasures
* execute the evasive maneuvers
* cover oneself with smoke
* jam the incoming missiles
* use decoys for approaching missiles
* enhance your armor protection with explosive reactive armor
k) Gather the intelligence about the enemy units, roads, bridges, residential
locations, ground characteristics etc.
* provide the physical retrieval of the intelligence material
1) Detect targets and the actions in the operation area
* find the range and exact location of targets
* classify the type of target
* identify objects to determine if they are friend or foe
* evaluate the immediate threat to the reconnaissance elements from
observed targets
* monitor any action of the targets and record it
m) Destroy the targets if observed by enemy
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* range the target
* make zoom adjustment, sight switchover and aiming
* fire the weapon
* evaluate the shot
n) Perform reconnaissance with fire if the situation requires
* notice and evaluate the reactions
o) Listen to the enemies tactical radio communications
* record the radio transmissions
* find the direction of the transmission
* use jamming on these frequency if it is ordered
p) Pass collected intelligence simultaneously to the operation center
* use secure communication systems for voice, data, picture transmission
q) Direct the fire support elements on the targets if required
4. Return from the Mission and Report the Reconnaissance Results
a) Choose the hidden receding routes
b) Coordinate the withdrawal with the friendly front elements
c) Deliver an elaborated intelligence report along with the digital recordings of
the mission. Debrief the mission results to higher authority
B. THE FORWARD OBSERVER VERSION OF IGUANA™
1. Join the Designated Unit and Coordinate About theOncoming Operations
a) Join the designated unit (tank or infantry company team etc.) in the assembly
area
b) Receive the unit's mission and the intelligence about the operating area to
make a tentative fire support plan
26
* become familiar with the maps of the operating area and load them into
vehicle's database
* enter the known targets into database
* learn the interface requirements with friendly forces
c) Load enough consumables (fuel, ammunition, provision etc.) while in the
assembly area for a logistic-free operation
d) Execute the fire control system checks as well as the hardware maintenance
checks (radios, automatic fire extinguishers, weapons etc.)
2. March to the Front Line and Prepare for the Attack
a) Provide early warning to the attached unit against ambushes and attack
helicopter raids during the forward approach
* inform the friendly units about the threat direction or location
b) Occupy a camouflaged position and scan the operation area
* use your long-range sensors to consolidate the intelligence gathering
elements' efforts
c) Maintain tight security around the vehicle
d) Coordinate with the foremost friendly elements about the latest enemy
situation
e) Gather the intelligence about the roads, bridges, residential locations, ground
characteristics, minefields etc.
f) Call correction fires to adjust the supporting fires and observe enemy
reactions
g) Locate the enemy's defensive lines, tactical command centers and
strongholds
* be consistent in use of sensors and time with the unit commander's target
priorities
h) Detect the targets and the enemy actions in the operating area
* find the range and exact location of the target
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* classify the type of target
* check the friend or foe identification of the target
* try to locate enemy artillery and mortar positions
* observe the operating area and report any hostile action
i) Intercept the enemy's tactical radio communications and try to locate the
transmitters
* record the transmissions
* find the direction to the transmitter
j) Pass all of the gathered intelligence to the unit commander in a timely way
k) Plan the preparatory fires and coordinate with all of the fire support elements
3. Attack with the Attached Unit
a) Execute the preparatory fires according to the timetable and evaluate them
b) Join the attached unit and move forward with it
c) Try to reduce vehicle's signatures
* make use of terrain, weather conditions and vehicle aspects to reduce the
visible, IR, acoustic, radar and seismic signatures of the vehicle
d) Pass through or bypass the obstacles
* detect the obstacles
* bypass them if possible
* pass them with appropriate approaching technique
e) Ford through the rivers or the artificial water canals
f) Protect the crew from the mines and maintain vehicle mobility
* try to detect minefields and bypass or breach them




* detect the contaminated areas and bypass them
* vacuum the air from outside and filter it for crew
* isolate the crew compartment against any infiltration
* provide the air-conditioned operating ambience
h) Identify any designator threat on the vehicle and take countermeasures
* execute the evasive maneuvers
* cover itself with smoke
* jam the incoming missiles
* use decoys for approaching missiles
i) Detect new targets, call fires on them, give the corrections about the support
* find the range and exact location of target
* identify the type of target
* determine the friend or foe identification on the target
* call, coordinate, correct, and evaluate the support fires
j) Execute the unit commander's specific fire support calls (close air support,
smoke fires, suppression fires etc.)
k) Report the defensive enemy unit's actions to the attacking commander
* use secure communication systems for voice, data, picture transmission
4. Implement Standard Procedures after the Target Capture
a) Get into a new position and maintain tight security measures
b) Call fire on the receding enemy elements
c) Prepare a defensive fire plan for an enemy counterattack
d) Scan deep into the enemy's operating area and inform the unit commander
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about enemy actions
e) Be ready for the following maneuver after parent unit has completed its
reorganizing period
C. THE ANTI-GUERRILLA VERSION OF IGUANA™
1 . March to the Operation Area
a) Get the operation order and prepare a tentative operation plan with friendly
forces
b) Load the consumables (fuel, ammunition, provision etc.) in the assembly area
for a logistic-free operation
* use maximum payload capacity to extend operation period
* arrange the storage sites to increase useable internal volume
* modify the modular hardware of the vehicle for a particular mission
c) Execute the fire control system checks as well as the hardware maintenance
checks (radios, automatic fire extinguishers, weapons etc.)
d) Escort the convoy of operation elements
* navigate according to the planning routes
* check your position and direction regularly
e) Provide early warning and protection against ambush attempts
f) Protect the crew from the mines and maintain vehicle mobility
* try to detect minefields and bypass or breach them
g) Recover the crippled vehicles
h) Pass through or bypass the obstacles
* detect the obstacles
* bypass them if possible
* pass them with appropriate approaching technique
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* ford through the rivers
i) Try to reduce vehicle's signatures
* make use of terrain, weather conditions and vehicle aspects to reduce the
visible, IR, acoustic, radar and seismic signatures of the vehicle
2. Search the Operation Area
a) Check the security of operating area prior to the deployment of the friendly
forces
b) Determine the critical places and passages
c) Update the operations center about the current terrain and weather conditions
* use secure communication systems for voice, data, picture transmission
d) Control the roads and the entrance and exit of the residential sites
3. Position the Vehicle
a) Move the vehicle to the assigned location
b) Maintain tight security around the vehicle
c) Camouflage the vehicle
d) Stand by for target acquisition
e) Provide air-conditioned operating ambience for crew
f) Intercept the guerrilla tactical radio transmissions and collect intelligence
* record the radio transmissions
* find the direction of the transmission
* use jamming on these frequency if it is ordered
4. Detect the Targets
a) Find the target's exact location and range
b) Classify the type of the target (a sharpshooter, an ATGM or SAM team or
guerrilla mortar position etc.)
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c) Identify the target as friend or foe
d) Predict the target's possible routes of advance
e) Evaluate the immediate threat level of the detected target for the friendly
forces
5. Coordinate with Other Elements
a) Define the engagement time to achieve surprise
b) Coordinate with friendly mobile ambushing teams
* give them the correct guerrilla position and enclosing route data
c) Coordinate with the artillery and mortar units for fire support
d) Coordinate with the attack helicopters and bombardment planes for fire
support
e) Report to the operations center the probable guerrilla withdrawal routes
6. Destroy the Targets
a) Sight and fire on the target
* range the target
* make zoom adjustment, sight switchover and aiming
* fire the selected weapon with effective ammunition type
* plot the fall of shot
* evaluate the fire effect on target
b) Channelize and correct the fire support on the guerrilla strongholds and
movements
c) Clear the guerrilla strongholds on the rough terrain
* lead the attack when the friendly units are pinpointed by the guerrilla
heavy fire
d) Execute the hot-pursuit operation
32
* don't lose contact with the guerrillas by maintaining close engagement
e) Keep aware of the operating area with long-range sensors and be prepared to
move to gain control
f) Evaluate and report the guerrilla casualties
g) Destroy the guerrilla logistic and training facilities
7. Return to the Base
a) Protect the withdrawing elements
b) Perform the same activities in the " the marching to the operation area
c) Give the operation records for the feedback, the creation of the new tactics
and the training needs
d) Provide the physical retrieval of the intelligence material
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V. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
The tactical usage of Iguana™ Armored Vehicle Family can be classified in the
three versions with a few modifications. These three versions are reconnaissance,
forward observer, and anti-guerrilla. The reconnaissance version with long-range sensors
is planned to conduct scout missions covertly in the highly dangerous modern warfare
environments. Its missions are patrolling, monitoring from an observation post,
reconnoitering for nuclear/biological/chemical reconnaissance, screening, guarding,
providing covering force, providing counter-reconnaissance, tactical raiding, pursuing,
conducting armed reconnaissance, providing liaison, providing traffic control, and
escorting. Reconnaissance is all about acquiring timely information about an enemy,
observing and keeping station on his movements and intentions, and then passing back
regular intelligence reports - all of which is best achieved by covert and stealthy means
to avoid contact and thus detection. The basic requirement of a reconnaissance force is to
survive undetected for as long as possible, especially when conducting deep penetration
operations against multi-layered defenses. [Ref. 3] The forward observer vehicle version
is planned to participate in combined armored warfare by solving the forward observer's
mobility and target acquisition problems. This kind of vehicle is required to
automatically create and rapidly disseminate indirect fire plans for immediate execution
and synchronization. The most revolutionary version is the anti-guerrilla version.
Guerrilla activities gravitate to the rough, swampy, and borderline regions, where
conventional forces are inefficient in terms of their mobility, detection, and firepower
performance. The increasing performance of modern weaponry (anti-tank guided
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missiles, surface to air missiles, sophisticated night vision and communication devices)
and its increasing availability to guerrillas along with the possibility of proliferation of
NBC weapons increases the operational capabilities of the guerrilla units. Thus, an
integrated anti-guerrilla warfare combatant, capable of overcoming some of the
inefficiencies of current forces, is in high demand to participate in irregular warfare.
The underlying operational advantage of all Iguana™ versions is its ability to be
readily configured to perform in the different operations ranging from anti -guerrilla
warfare to the conventional warfare with only minor modifications. The logistic cost
incurred by multiple specialized vehicles used today will be minimized by the design of
the Iguana™, which envisions significant autonomous operating capability. The weapon,
sensor, and communication equipment selections enable the vehicle to react as an
integrated combat element. The current alternative vehicles generally focus on one of the
TTV Ik T*\ /I
basic functions of the Iguana . However, Iguana can be regarded as an integrated
combat system with innovative technologic advances rather than a partial solution. Its
design must permit all further modifications that may be necessary to keep pace with
evolving requirements.
B. THREAT
Combat vehicles will be subject to diverse attacks in the dynamic threat
environment experienced during different types of operation. The threat forces will
attempt to extend the depth of their attacks through extended range weapons, rapid
maneuver, and more sophisticated command, control, communications and intelligence
functions.
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Border infiltration on the rough terrain by guerrilla groups or drug smugglers
creates a serious threat. Closing long borders with limited forces requires combatants
that are equipped with the Iguana™ armored vehicles. The Iguana™'s reaction ability
against the detected infiltration attempts enhances its deterring effect.
Rapid deployment forces are required to effectively intervene in regional clashes
or crises on unknown or poorly known and often rough terrain. Light, air-transportable
or airdrop armored units are needed in the rapid deployment forces. Iguana™ 's tactical
intelligence gathering ability can help to direct the following forces to the expected
success areas.
The increasing amount of the UN peace-keeping operations require the
combatants with superior detection performance to make timely observations of
violations. Combatants also must successfully defend themselves in case of any attack.
The peacekeeping missions frequently demand the accurate identification of violators
with high-resolution sensors and recording cameras.
The modern warfare playground demands highly maneuverable, destructive, and
informed reconnaissance vehicles that can operate independently deep in the enemy
territory. The predicted high loses rate of the current scout platoons demands a new kind
of reconnaissance vehicle concept that enables the scout crew to detect the targets at long
range without entering their opponents detection envelope. However, it is crucial that the
tactical intelligence gathered be promptly transferred, but such transfer may be detected.
Therefore attention must be paid to information security at both the basic "signature"
level as well as in terms of "false information". Thus, these vehicles must be designed to
employ electronic warfare countermeasures.
37
Forward observers in their vehicles will find themselves assigned to move side by
side with armored units and detect the targets in the long range. Current forward
observer vehicles are not able to operate with the tank units because they can't achieve
the same speed or operate on all of the same terrain. Thus, the effective fire support of
the armored units can't be implemented and this leads to higher casualty rates.
Land mines will extensively be used to restrict the armor units' maneuver
capacity and to destroy them without direct engagement. Most of the casualties in the
armored vehicles are due to the spalling problem which occurs when a kinetic energy or
shaped charge round impact and penetrates into the vehicle armor. Thus, Iguana™ armor
specifications must provide an effective anti-mine protection as well as a reliable solution
to the spalling problem.
Today, new top attack smart weapons can easily be launched by artillery and
mortar units. Most current vehicles have a critical vulnerability on their tops because the
armor protection there is less. Iguana™ is to provide a uniform protection level over the
entire armored surface, it can also be helpful to locate these mortar positions with its
sophisticated sensors immediately.
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS
The main shortcoming of the current armored combatants is the lack of complete
combat system integration for the full spectrum of battlefield threats. They are basically
upgraded or modified from the older conceptualized vehicles from the Cold War period.
But current asymmetric warfare conditions create a new set of requirements. The new
combatants mainly need an autonomous operational capability so that they can move on
the different types of ground and destroy targets at extended ranges without being
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significant degradation of capability from the changing weather and day/night conditions.
It is also obvious that an extensive and simultaneous communication system must be set
up for the coordination among the individual vehicles and tactical operation centers.
These kinds of data, picture and voice transfers to the operation centers will help the
decision-taking process of the commanders.
The reduction of the radar cross section, IR and acoustic signatures for future
generations of vehicles is a fundamental necessity for both stealthy tactics and battlefield
survival. Flourishing gun and armor piercing technologies compel the consideration of
innovative armor protection solutions. The top attack smart weapons that can be easily
launched by mortars pose a new kind of threat to the armored units. The bottom and top
armor have to be taken into account like the frontal arc armor. Because of the recent
advent of 12.7-mm sniper rifles and their potential use for ambushing reconnaissance
vehicles, the vulnerability of the light wheeled reconnaissance vehicles seriously
increases. The deficiencies of the situational awareness technology on current vehicles
seriously degrade their surveillance ability. The sensor and countermeasure
combinations for integrated survivability must be able to operate autonomously, while
retaining semi-automatic and manual modes. The UAV, satellite and other aerial
reconnaissance devices are heavily dependent on the weather conditions. For the close
coordination with the attack, scout and support helicopters, Iguana™ must have proper
communication, sensor and designator devices to direct the helicopters to the targets.
Increasing environmental concerns impose more restrictions on the military vehicles'




1 . System Performance
The following standards generally show the minimum system performance
requirements to overcome current systems' shortcomings. They are originated from the
functional flows of Iguana™. For example, the following system performance
requirements are linked to the demanded subordinate functions of the reconnaissance
version of Iguana™. These subordinate functions' numbers are shown in parenthesis at
the end of each system performance requirement respectively.
a) Iguana™ will have a 700 miles road range.
It can operate in the deep in enemy territory with limited logistic resupply. It
must also have a coherent operational endurance range compatible with other armored
elements without further refuel and maintenance needs. (Id, 3a)
b) Iguana™ mobility requirements:
* The combat weight of Iguana™ can be up to 15 tons.
* It can be quickly transported or airdropped by the transportation planes.
* Iguana™' s gross power to weight ratio will be 25 hp/t at least.
* Iguana™'s road (tarmac) speed can reach 75 km/h.
* Iguana™ 's reverse speed can reach 40 km/h.
* Iguana™'s afloat speed can reach 10 km/h.
* Iguana™ 's unpaved speed can reach 40 km/h.
* Iguana™ can turn 360 degree within a 9 m external turning radius.
* Iguana™ can turn 360 degree in 8 seconds pivoting time in water.
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* Iguana™ can climb vertically up to 1.8 m height in the forward direction.
* Iguana™ 's ditch crossing can reach across 1.8 m.
* Iguana™ can climb up a 65% forward or reverse slope on a dry hard
surface along the longitudinal axis of the vehicle.
* Iguana™ can cross a 40% dry hard surface side slope and retain its track
during side hill maneuvers.
* Iguana™ can accelerate to 50 km/h speed in 10 seconds.
* Iguana™ 's unprepared fording depth can reach 1.4 m.
* Iguana™ has a moving ability at 50% slope from the stationary position.
* Deep water fording preparation time by the crew is within 3 minute.
* Iguana™ must be capable of stopping (from maximum speed to a full stop)
at a rate of at least 8 meters/sec" with minimal side drift (less than 1.5 meters in 15 meters
on a dry, level, hard surface). [Ref. 4]
* Iguana™ driver can adjust the peak pressures under the wheels to improve
mobility in the soft soil and deep snow conditions while it generates minima disturbance
of terrain.
* Because of the likely rough-terrain and night operating regime, rollover
stability is a vital priority for Iguana™.
* A clear rearview of the vehicle from the driver's instrument panel will
allow rapid evasive maneuvers to be carried out.
All of these parameters are related to the need for superior physical agility
and obstacle passing capacity. Iguana™ is considered because of its nearly unique ability
to operate over a diverse combination of terrain under diverse weather conditions where
the current vehicles have serious mobility handicaps. (Id, 3a, 3e, 3f, 3g)
c) Armored vehicles must possess fully automated contamination avoidance
sensors that provide early warning for the full spectrum of radiological, chemical, and
biological contaminants. These detectors must categorize and classify contaminants,
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determine the degree and the location of contamination, and possess sufficient sensitivity
to permit a maneuver force to avoid contaminated areas. (3i)
d) The maximum dimensions of Iguana™ will be:
Width = 2.5 m, Height = 2.5 m, Length = 6 m
The dimensions can't expand beyond these values because of the low
silhouette, minimum exposed target signature and transportation considerations.
Iguana hull design must facilitate amphibious operations. (3b, 3g)
e) Target range determination must be between 200-10000 m with +/- 5m
tolerance while target discrimination is 20 m between targets. The destruction of a target
mainly depends on the correct range data input to fire control system. (31)
f) Iguana™ adjustable ground clearance can be between 20 cm and 50 cm.
It enables Iguana™ to adjust itself in a firing position at the optimum level to reduce its
exposure to the enemy eye. It also helps to move on the different terrain types
accordingly. (3b, 3e)
g) Sensor specifications:
* The sensor suite must meet a 95 % probability detection and recognition
standard in the 1 dB/km atmospheric attenuation condition by meeting the following
target range requirements:
# Tank, APC, and helicopter target detection range must be 10 km. while
their recognition ranges are 3.8 km. The 10-km detection range generally gives enough
time to verify the target identification with other means and to clarify the enemy
intentions. It is also enough distance to direct and correct the friendly support fire on
42
them. The 3.8-km recognition range is generally beyond the effective tank gun and anti-
tank missile threat distance thus reducing the Iguana™ risk of being engaged.
# For personnel targets, the detection range must reach 4.8 km. with a 1.24
km recognition range. The 4.8 km detection range for personnel detection is enough to
verify target identification with other means, to understand the tactical situation, to
prevent security perimeter penetrations, to open direct fire on them, and to channelize the
support fires, for example, mortar fire onto them. The 1.24 km recognition range gives
enough tactical flexibility to protect friendly troops from the effects of heavy machine
gun fire, sniper fire, and light anti-tank weapons.
* Iguana™ must have the capability of designating missiles to targets and
conducting detailed damage/kill assessments on them.
* Iguana™ 's sensor suite can operate above the trees and knolls to observe
enemy activities without completely exposing the entire vehicle.
* Iguana™ 's sensor suite must be protected from artillery and mortar shell
fragments without obstructing sensor apertures.
* The sensor suite must have 0.1-mrad line-of-sight stabilization to
compensate adverse high frequency random motion (jitter). Jitter reduces target
recognition range for resolution-limited systems by negatively corrupting high spatial
frequencies.
* Sensor sights must also function as engagement sights. While wide field of
view (WFOV) is used for search and target acquisition sight, narrow field of view
(NFOV) can be used for the engagement and damage assessment sighting.
* Sensor platform must perform effectively day or night in adverse weather,
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in cluttered background environments, and in the presence of countermeasures that
include screening, jamming, and the use of low observable and active defense systems.
* The sensor suite must have the ability to conduct:
# automated wide-area search (sensor scan sector can be limited in 10-180
degrees of axes while the center of this sector can be freely selected within 360
degrees)
# automated target acquisition, and prioritization
# automated tracking at extended ranges.
Automation of these capabilities reduces crew workload, shortens
engagement timelines to acquire targets, and as a result increases the effectiveness of
direct fire. The ability to acquire and hand over targets automatically, supports the
design goal of a combat vehicle with fewer crew members that is more lethal and more
deployable with improved situational awareness on the digitized battlefield. (2a, 31, 3n)
h) Iguana™ 's low detectable multi-spectral signature (visible, infrared, radar,
seismic, and acoustic) will be as critical as its armor technology for the survival
concerns.(2c,3b,3c)
g) A stabilized turret will have a 90 degrees per second slew rate in elevation
and traverse direction. Its angle of traverse will be 360 degrees while its angle of
elevation is between -10 and +65 degrees. A manual back-up system in addition to the
electro-mechanical turret control is essential. Destruction of different types of targets at 3
km requires combined weapon systems in the turret. The fire-on-the-move capability
(turret stabilization system) against both static and mobile targets will provide a robust
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effect on the gunnery. An armored vehicle must have self-defense ability at minimum for
the independent operation capability.(3m,3n)
j) Iguana™ must provide a standard armor protection against 14.5-mm heavy
machine gun rounds and artillery splinters. Additional ballistic protection kits can
enhance the survivability against the 30-mm Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding
Sabot (APFDS) rounds fired from a 1000-m. range. Even if stealth characteristics are
achieved, the total defense system of Iguana™ can't be solely dependent on them without
an effective armor protection. Armor will continue to play a significant role in the
survival concept.(3h,3j)
2. Logistics and Readiness
a) The proposed crew number is three. Driver is mainly responsible for the
control of the vehicle's motion. The gunner's main missions are engagement of targets
and the operation of the sensor suite. The commander is mainly responsible for the
management of the engagement and the communications. He is also capable of using the
weapon systems in emergency situations. The reduced crew number allows the Iguana™
design to achieve a lower profile.
b) The armored vehicles sometimes are crippled on rough or slippery terrain.
Iguana™'s must recover each other with the help of their towing equipment.
c) Without removing the turret, the engine shall be removable with the help of a
recovery vehicle and crew on all terrain conditions in two hours. This will increase the
operational readiness of the vehicle.
d) The automatic fire suppression system's reaction time must be under seven
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milliseconds. If the vehicle has been shot, this system will increase the survival
probability. Moreover, an automatic engine shutoff system, in case of fire, may save the
vehicle. The important design issue is the definition of the correct fire detection
threshold values to avoid false alarms for the automatic fire suppression system.
e) The engine cooling system performance is critical in hot climate conditions.
The presence of heavy dust and sand impose great demand for a higher air filter capacity
for Iguana™. However, in the very cold regions the prestart heating of the engine may
be necessary before cranking engine.
f) The quantity of stored ammunition must be large enough to support
independent operations of duration 3 days with 2 major encounters. An isolated
ammunition storage compartment will enhance survivability.
g) Iguana™ will require greatly improved electrical power generation, storage,
switching, and distribution. These systems must be capable of providing the electrical
power to the different subsystems of Iguana™ such as the electric drive system and the
command and control system. Electrical power components must be sized and packaged
for efficient vehicle application, thereby requiring increased energy densities. They must
not introduce human health hazards or unnecessary system vulnerabilities. [Ref. 4]
h) All of the electronic devices are considered as functional between -40 C and
+ 50 C climatic temperature ranges. Their resistance to the extreme moisture and
barometric situations is also important. The vehicle electronic infrastructure must protect
from the nuclear explosion electromagnetic pulse.
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i) On-board storage sites designed for the camouflage net, water cans,
provisions, crew belongings etc. Iguana™ must be able to accept sufficient power from
an external source to start engine, run diagnostic routines and to activate its sensor suite.
j) From a non-operational status (non-operational for at least 4 consecutive
hours), upon application of power, Iguana™ will be fully mission capable (i.e., able to
move, communicate and perform surveillance and survivability functions) within 3
minutes. From a warm status, it must be fully operational in 10 seconds. [Ref.4]
2. Critical System Characteristics
a) Passive missile and laser warning sensors with active electronic and IR
countermeasures will improve battlefield survivability.
b) Secure tactical communication nets (includes air-ground communication)
must be operational with a 40 km range. The netting of the vehicle with outside infantry
directly contributes to operational efficiency. Enemy radio intercept and jamming are
always big handicaps in armored warfare.
c) Intentional or unintentional loss or interruption of system power must not
cause non-recoverable loss of critical mission data from the on-board electronics system.
But there must be quick deletion process in case of the vehicle's capture by the hostile
forces. [Ref. 4]
d) The design and construction of Iguana™ must minimize safety and health
risks to operators, maintenance and support personnel. [Ref. 4]
e) System design and configuration will be based on incorporation of
"enablers" which will facilitate application of matured technologies and/or allow for
growth in the following areas [Ref. 4]:
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* Addition/modification of electronic components (hardware and software)
* Propulsion system, suspension and frame to permit system combat-loaded
weight growth of 15 percent
* Application of improved armor
* Addition of electronic vulnerability reduction measures without redesign of
the electronic network
* Biological agent detection
E. INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
1. Maintenance Planning
Iguana™ will use the four level maintenance concept consisting of the unit level,
direct support (DS), general support (GS), and depot level maintenance. Maintenance is
characterized by quick turnaround and repair replacement of components, modules, or
units will occur at the lowest possible level of maintenance. Periodic maintenance is
scheduled according to the mileage accrued.
a) Unit level maintenance: Operator/crew will focus on diagnostics/prognostics
using on-board equipment. Unit mechanics will focus on diagnostics/prognostics repairs
using more capable equipment and repair with replaceable components and/or
modules. [Ref. 4]
b) Direct Support (DS) maintenance: It is characterized by mobile maintenance
support teams who can do fault diagnosis and perform maintenance functions. DS
maintenance will repair "common/quick fix" equipment failures on the critical weapons
systems. [Ref.4]
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c) General Support (GS) maintenance: It is characterized by commodity repair
of components and end items. GS maintenance units will repair by component
replacement, repair components for replacement or repair replaced components for return
to the exchange point for future reissue. [Ref. 4]
d) Depot level maintenance support: It is characterized by overhaul and repair
of end items, components and modules, and repair which exceeds the capability of lower
maintenance levels. [Ref. 4]
2. Support Equipment:
a) The vehicle must have enough on-board equipment for the basic tests and
repairs like track repair and adjustment. Towing tools and position fortification
equipment are also important. The recovery vehicle must possess the elaborate enough
repair tools to remove and replace the engine.
b) Automatic system checks, modular changeable subsystems, warning
spotlights on the instrument panel, automatic security fuses for operational failures are
useful design features for maintenance and operation. Easy access to periodic
maintenance spots will minimize the repair time.
c) The average operation available period percentage must exceed 90% against
the overall maintenance period.
3. Human System Integration
a) Air-conditioned operating environment is required.
b) Ergonomic seating places and controls are critical for crew performance.
c) Iguana™ crew must undergo at least 6 month basic and crew training on the
vehicle and its combat system.
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d) Gunner must demonstrate capability taught in the basic driver training
course.
e) Simulator training will enhance the crew performance during the force-on-
force combat training.
f) Periodic field exercises will consolidate the simulator training.
g) The teaching of operational safety measures must take a high level priority
during the training period.
h) Laser engagement systems can be integrated into field exercises,
i) The vehicle software must be designed so that fault entry logic can detect
errors in order to minimize incorrect crew entries, which could cause a hazardous
situation. [Ref. 4]
4. Computer Resources
a) Iguana™ must have on-board computer resources for decision aids such as
automatic updating of overlays on the tactical map display, position and navigation
control, automotive control, weapons control, self-defense systems, communication
processing, diagnostic/prognostics, maintenance and operator/maintenance training. The
centralized data processor nods will increase the capacity usage and the vehicle's
computer system will have enough flexibility to conduct its functions in case of any
partial failure.
b) Iguana™ is planned to gather intelligence by using its own sensors. The
storage and distribution of this intelligence take must be supported by a strong database
and network capability.
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5. Other Logistic Considerations
a) Iguana™ must provide a means for routine inspecting, testing, and cleaning
of subsystems without removal of major assemblies. [Ref. 4]
b) Technical maintenance manuals must be prepared in detail.
F. INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT AND INTEROPERABILITY
1. Command, Control, Communications, & intelligence
a) Iguana™ must interface with the command, control, communication and
intelligence architecture of the other armored unit elements.
b) Iguana™ must be capable of transmitting and receiving secure digital data
and operating on two secure voice radio communications nets.
c) The system must provide warnings. These warnings must not interrupt
mission critical functions (move, communicate, surveillance and survive), unless it
creates unsafe or hazardous situations. [Ref. 4]
d) Iguana™ sensor images can be displayed in the aiming and observation
screens in real time and recorded for later analysis and training feedback.
e) It is critical for Iguana™ to have a clear inter-vehicular communication that
can be joined by the outside infantry.
2. Transportation and Basing
The maximum combat weight limit is decided set 15 ton. This limit allows for
airdrop operations. For rapid deployment operations, air transportation ability of
Iguana™ supports the vehicle's deployment flexibility. Sea, rail and road transportation
options must negotiate with the NATO standards. Iguana™ must be tried to use its own
mobility only in the actual operation area. The basing facilities will include the
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maintenance and supply units for Iguana™. It must be located as close to the operation
area without lessening the security criteria.
3. Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality
a) Iguana™ will use standard battlefield combat identification system
procedures and equipment to reduce the potential for fratricide.
b) Standard components, parts, tools, fasteners, fuel type and test equipment
will be used to the maximum extent possible. [Ref. 4]
c) Iguana™ will be a metric based system.
4. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support
Iguana™ must have an on-board self-locating capability with an on-board tactical
display to assist the crew in selecting and navigating from one position to the next by
using the hybrid navigation systems. [Ref. 4] Digital map data support related to the
operation area is required.
5. Environmental Support
Room temperature and low level moisture environment is necessary for the depot
level storage. There is no special environment support activity except arctic regions.
G. FORCE STRUCTURE
The proposed force structure of the system will change for the different versions
»i«» * *T*\ A
of the Iguana . The Iguana number in the artillery battalion will depend on the
observation team number (usually 3 or 4). For the reconnaissance version, the number
can reach 12 in a cavalry company. The anti-guerrilla version can be used at least as a
section (2 Iguana™). But the number can become 4 in a platoon for the administrative
and maintenance considerations.
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Suppose that you try to equip 10 armored brigades with Iguana™s. The cavalry
companies of the armored brigade needs 12 reconnaissance version of the Iguana™. The
armored brigade fire support forward observer team number can be 13 similar to the
number of maneuver company teams in the armored brigade. Moreover, if you try to
firmly control the orange country border against any guerrilla infiltration, then the
following logic applies. This border sector is 250 km long and generally has a
mountainous character. The border security battalions are covering an average 25-km
section. Each battalion needs a platoon of 4 Iguana™s to close its portion of the border
against the guerrilla infiltration and raids. So the required number of the anti-guerrilla
versions is 40. The total force structure consists then of 120 reconnaissance Iguana™s,
130 forward observer vehicle Iguana™s and 40 anti -guerrilla version Iguana™s. Thus
the total Iguana™ force level would be 290 in the mix described.
H. SCHEDULE CONSIDERATIONS
When the delivery order of the Iguana™ fleet is considered, the following
schedule can be proposed for the 290 Iguana™ acquisition. Software will be developed
in conjunction with the development of this system, as will appropriate embedded
training manuals, repair parts lists, and special tools list. The building of the
manufacturing facilities (1 year) and the basic training period on the vehicle (6 months)
can also be carried out simultaneously along the following steps.
1. The mission and operation requirements study: 1 year
2. The combat system design and configuration process: 2.5 years
3. The prototypes' production and the test and selection process: 1.5 years
4. Serial production of the 290 Iguana™s: 3 years
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TM,
5. Total time for bringing a force of 290 Iguana s into service: 8 years
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VI. THE APPLICATION OF COMPOSITE MATERIALS IN THE
ARMORED VEHICLE CONSTRUCTION
The application of lightweight thick composites in armored land combat vehicles
will overcome the current conventional metal vehicle construction problems. Composite
armor usually consists of glass laminates and matrix material. It can be also covered with
ceramic tiles for better penetration resistance. The curing temperature and the
temperature gradient, the applied pressure and the pressure gradient, and curing duration
are important parameters in composite armor manufacturing processes. The residual
stresses can be controlled during the manufacturing phase and lead to control of direction
of propagation of the high velocity impact shock. For long life cycle service, the
elimination of air pockets in the composite armor is very critical. Otherwise, the
infiltration of moisture to these air pockets quickly leads to a delamination of the
composite armor. Friction with the metal components, like the vehicle's track, can
damage the composite material. Covering these parts of the armor with a protective layer
of metal reduces this wear. Another important manufacturing criteria that must be taken
into consideration is that lengthy exposure to ultraviolet radiation can decompose the
composite material integrity. In the view of the developers of composite armors, the
main obstacle to its extensive use in armored vehicles is the reluctance of the tank
designers and constructors to adapt themselves to this new technology. They would be
forced to change their production processes, workforce and the metal-based knowledge to
those of the highly competitive composite-manufacturing environment. The composite
vehicle benefits over the metal hull construction can be illustrated in the following
aspects:
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1. Composite armor provides superior crew survivability in the modern
battlefield. The fiber reinforced polymer composite structural armor exhibits higher
damage tolerance than the conventional armor protection. The tensile strength,
compressive strength, specific stiffness and flexural strength values of composite armor
are better than rolled homogeneous steel armor (RHA) even if RHA incorporates
ceramics. Composite armor protection performance will significantly increase when it is
used with explosive reactive armor plates. The spall suppression in the composite armor
reduces the crew casualty by limiting the spallation spray area. It also lifts the spall liner
requirement.
2. The reduced thermal, radar and acoustic vehicle signatures of composite armor
decrease the probability of being detected by enemy. Composite armor provides a
significant hull weight reduction to accommodate increased swimming, fuel, ammo
storage, add-on armor performance improvements. The structure and armor of Iguana™
will weigh at least 33 percent less than comparable steel or aluminum. It also enhances
rapid mobility and deployment capability for the armored vehicles.
3. Composite armor has much higher insulation against tropical and arctic
climates due to the low thermal conductivity. While it supports the thermal signature
reduction, it also enhances the crew protection from the harsh climate conditions.
4. Composite armor has high damage tolerance and multi-hit capability because
of the higher energy absorption capacity. It has the higher fatigue strength and lower
fatigue crack growth rate. It is resistant to high shear stresses.
5. It has higher damping and reduced vibration amplitudes. Much of the noise in
armored vehicles is caused by metal hull vibrations when the engines are running.
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Composite armor approximately provides a 50% reduction on the interior vehicle crew
space noise level. So the acoustic noise attenuation in composite armored combat
vehicles increases the crew intercommunication efficiency and reduces the crew fatigue
because of the low noise level.
6. It is highly resistant to chemicals and solvents (sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid
etc.) compared to steel and aluminum.
7. It exhibits superior explosive blast resistance against mine ruptures in the belly
armor of the armored vehicle.
8. It is highly flame resistant (self-extinguishing) with extremely low smoke
generation because of the high content of glass laminates.
9. It has maintenance kits for easy repairability and nondestructive testing
methods for failure diagnosis.
11. The molding of complex shapes is much easier than in metal in terms of
structural integrity.
12. It supports reliable, repeatable and accurate modular composite part fabrication
by making easy bonding process with ceramic tile.
14. The unit cost of the composite armored vehicle is more economical in the large
quantity serial production (500 or above) than that of the metal hull vehicle production.
15. Composite laminates are not susceptible to galvanic corrosion since none of its
constituents appear in an electromotive series.
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VII. HYBRID DRIVE SYSTEMS FOR THE ARMORED VEHICLES
Although the idea of electrically powered military vehicles has been around since
1940s, recent technologic breakthroughs have made the idea more plausible as a viable
alternative to the internal-combustion-engine-powered vehicles. Hybrid electric engines
use a combination of electrical power and conventional fuel to improve power and fuel
consumption. The acceleration of the conventional fuel vehicle from a stop requires
more fuel which means more exhaust gases produced. However, the electric motors
generate full torque from a stop and waste very little energy while idling. The electrically
driven armored vehicles have very high peak operating capabilities while an on-board
intercooled-turbocharged motor generator maintains the energy reserve of the traction
battery system. The vehicle never has to be recharged from an electrical power source.
The internal diagnostics/prognostics systems and modularity facilitate the maintenance
process. It operates solely from the conventional diesel fuel. Because of the high
operating efficiency, fuel economy of the vehicle is more than doubled and the common
fuel logistic concerns of the armored warfare are significantly reduced while the same
operating range of the armored vehicle is maintained. In addition, the airborne emissions
are also dramatically lowered.
The hybrid vehicles produce no exhaust plume in electric mode. The electric
drive motors that support thermal management with a liquid cooling process run quietly
and radiate little heat to be detected by infrared cameras or sensors. It has the capability
of silent watch operation for extended periods of time. The acoustic signature of the
vehicle will be reduced more significantly if the vehicle is fitted with rubber band tracks.
The vehicle engine exhaust can also be minimized through special exhaust ducting for the
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lower infrared signature. While stationary, the hybrid-electric vehicle engine and
generator can be used to supply electric power for the command posts in the field.
Because of the digitized drive-by-wire controls, the hybrid electric driven vehicles can be
easily adapted to the unmanned-robotic surveillance and reconnaissance operations for
highly risk missions. The all-electric servo drives that are digitally controlled are
preferable for armored vehicle turrets rather than the electrohydraulic drives. While this
improvement enhances the stabilization accuracy and fire protection, it is also coherent
with the innovative hybrid and robotic technologies.
Hybrid electric propulsion technology is highly favored for its internal volume
and design-flexibility advantages. The electro-mechanical transmission that replaces the
standard hydro-mechanical transmission systems consists of a generator coupled directly
to the vehicle's engine and separate motors driving each sprocket of a tracked vehicle, the
only connection between the generator and the motors being electric cables. The
independently controlled lightweight compact permanent-magnet brushless direct-current
electric motors have microprocessor-controlled inverters. These motors consist of a rotor
with rare-earth permanent magnets mounted around the stator and relatively thin but
larger in diameter than conventional DC motors. They can produce more torque and their
torque based traction control assures smooth vehicle operation. The gear change
requirements can be eliminated by the phase advance controls. To minimize the space
taken up by the transmission within the hull, the electric motors can be located externally.
The trailing road wheels transmit the drive to the tracks and eliminate the sprocket drive
requirement. The unison regeneration method allows the maximum power generation.
Because of much higher power density, the power electronics incorporate Insulated Gate
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Bipolar Transistors (IGBTs) which, in turn, reduce cooling requirements. This
contributes to the total volume reduction of the transmission. Further reductions in
volume are expected to come from the development of silicon carbide semiconductor
devices, which are capable of operating at higher temperatures. The classic type of
electric transmission in which the generator and motors are only connected by cables
enjoys several advantages over mechanical or hydro-mechanical transmissions but there
is a problem with it in tracked vehicles. This problem arises from the fact that in tracked
vehicles transmissions are used not only in propulsion but also for steering; if this is to be
done efficiently large amounts of power have to be transferred from one track to the
other. This means that the driving motors also have to act at times as generators, which
can be arranged without difficulty. However, the amounts of power regenerated at the
inner track during a turn and transferred to the outer track are large; for this reason the
motors of electric transmission with regenerative steering have to be significantly larger
than they would be if they were only used for propulsion. An innovative electro-
mechanical transmission in the figure 1 can be considered to overcome this problem.
[Ref. 5]
Superior acceleration and top speed capabilities of this technology enhance the
agility of the armored vehicles. It enables the armored vehicle to realize rapid starts from
a stop without the delay of starting the gas engine. To change positions quickly and to
rush forward to the target in the minimum time exposed to enemy eyes are some of the
tactical engagement advantages. The vehicle can travel an additional 30-km distance in
electric mode using the present lead-acid battery package. The available power is also
sufficient to operate on-board equipment such as radars, radios, and lasers. When
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operating in the stealth mode, without running the on-board recharging motor-generator,
the armored vehicle is quiet, cool, and emits no exhaust. This ability will improve the
silent creeping capability of the vehicle to maneuver in on the enemy positions during
scout missions or in tactical raids. The maintenance-free sealed lead-acid batteries use
the co-extruded composite matrix technology that creates a lead-coated glass fiber wire
woven into mesh. The mesh is coated with an active material, cut into grids, separated by
absorptive glass fiber mats and stacked in a reinforced box. The woven grid design is
configured in multiple shapes and sizes to meet a wide variety of energy storage
requirements. There are also some trials about the adoption of lithium-ion or
nickel/metal hybrid batteries to increase the all-electric range.
The field trials for the integration of electric drive into the prototype HMMWV,
Ml 13 APC and Bradley EFV are being conducted. There are also application plans of
this technology under consideration for the modified versions of M-l series Abrams tank.
Future work will strive to refine this technology to further improve its performance and to
integrate these concepts into other vehicles identified for future battlefield environments.
There are some efforts to improve the electro-magnetic and electrothermal-chemical guns
as well as electromagnetic armor for the armored vehicles. The basic ingredients of
hybrid electric drive systems can be used jointly by these guns to create an "all-electric"
armored combat vehicle.
Figure 2 shows the principal components of an electro-mechanical transmission.
While Figure 3 shows the main components of a hybrid electric drive system for armored
vehicles, Figure 4 shows the prototype hybrid electric propulsion Bradley Infantry
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Figure 2. The principal components of the Renk EMT 1 100 electro-mechanical
transmission (from JANE'S INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW 1/1999)
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Figure 3. Hybrid Electric Drive System Main Components
BRADLEY HYBRID ELECTRIC PROPULSION SYSTEM














Figure 4. Prototype Bradley Hybrid Electric Propulsion System
(from www.tacom.army.mil/tardec/electric_drive/bradley/sld001 .htm)
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VIII. THE COMPARASION OF THE POSSIBLE ELECTRIC
DRIVE SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR ARMORED
VEHICLES
A. ELECTRIC MACHINES
1. Direct Current (DC) Machines: They are physically larger due to the presence
of a commutator and brush assembly. This also contributes to high initial and
maintenance costs. The commutator also imposes a limit on the maximum machine
speed and contributes significant electro-magnetic interference (EMI) concerns. DC
machine control is simple but the large volume and low torque density makes it
unattractive for compact systems.
2. Reluctance Machines: Its design is simple, cheap and rugged. The power factor
is poor resulting in the requirement of larger devices in the power converter. Since there
is no excitation on the rotor, the air gap is relatively small. This is an unattractive feature
for a machine in a high-shock environment due to the possibility of stator and rotor
coming in contact.
3. Field Wound Synchronous Machines: They require a separate DC source for the
rotor winding and occasional maintenance on the brushes and slip rings. Since the rotor
is excited, the air gap will be fairly large, improving reliability in a high-shock
environment. The field winding facilitates control of terminal voltage or power factor.
This type of synchronous machine is often times used in high-power low-speed
applications, such as ship propulsion, where the machine's torque density has no rival.
4. Induction Machines: They require relatively small air gaps since the rotor
currents must be induced from the stator-derived rotating magnetic field. Despite this
negative regarding shock performance, induction machines are cheap, rugged and require
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little maintenance. The efficiency is generally lower than a synchronous machine and it
must always operate at a lagging power factor. Induction machines are used in many
electric drive applications for commercial vehicles.
5. Permanent Magnet (PM) Machines: Since high energy density magnets supply
the rotor excitation, the air gap of PM machines may be large to permit its usage on
moving platforms. These machines, which have small volume occupation characteristics,
operate at high efficiency, high power factor and have a high power density. Despite
high initial cost, PM machines are steadily displacing induction machines in medium-
power electric-drive applications such as military vehicles.
B. POWER CONVERTERS
1. Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) Inverter: It is a mature technology whose
control is straightforward. The harmonics produced by the converter are well defined and
can be made small by going to higher switching frequencies. This results in very
sinusoidal machine currents and therefore very little torque pulsation. Since there is
typically a capacitor at the input, regenerated energy must be accounted for by additional
control mechanisms. It is commonly used in the hybrid electric drive systems.
2. Current Source Inverter (CSI): It uses older SCR technology, which introduces
some commutation issues. It may be load commutated when operated with an over-
excited field-wound synchronous machine, but otherwise, additional forced commutated
circuitry is required. At high power PWM operation is generally not possible and torque
pulsation may become prohibitive. In addition, the quasi-square wave machine currents
lead to losses in the machine that requires derating. One particular advantage of the CSI
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is that regeneration is straightforward. The CSI is used in very high power applications
together with the field-wound synchronous machine.
3. Cycloconverter: Its structure is rather complicated with numerous semiconductor
devices. It operates at a relatively poor power factor and introduces considerable issues
regarding harmonics. It also has attractive regeneration characteristics but it tends to be a
larger converter due to the additional filters and isolation transformers that are required.
Cycloconverter drives are found in the large ship propulsion drives.
C. POWER DEVICE TECHNOLOGIES
1. Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR): It has no direct control of turn off.
2. Bipolar Junction Transistor (BJT): It provides limited switching frequency.
3. Field Effect Transistors (FETs): Despite facilitating the highest switching
frequencies, these devices do not commonly have a high enough current rating to be
found in high power electric drive applications.
4. Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistors (IGBTs): It is suitable for high power
applications and it has relatively high switching frequency.
5. MOS Controlled Transistors (MCTs): It very new technology. It can be




Future armored vehicles must possess the tactical, operational, and strategic
mobility and agility required to survive and to dominate the maneuver battle. This
requirement includes the ability to rapidly move cross-country and on roads, in all natural
and man-made environments to include water obstacles. Key components of tactical
mobility include speed, acceleration, obstacle (including mines) detection and avoidance,
NBC detection and avoidance, and armored vehicle suspension systems capable of
stabilizing the platform to within crew, weapons, and structural specific requirements.
Operational mobility includes resupply frequency, number of required maintenance or
rest halts, similar tactical mobility levels for all members of armored unit, and ability to
operate with infrastructure (such as bridge or tunnel) constraints. Strategic mobility
includes sea, rail, air, and road transportability as well as logistical requirements. Future
armored vehicles must be able to rapidly deploy into primitive theaters of operations and
execute combat missions immediately, with little or no infrastructure or logistic support.
Enhanced mobility adds greater flexibility to armored units, allowing them to take action
faster than an enemy can react. It also gives the armored unit commander more options
in terms of friendly courses of action. This capability increases the lethality and
survivability of armored units, allowing quicker results on the battlefield with fewer
friendly casualties.
Iguana™ 's mission theater is extended to the rougher terrain where current
conventional vehicles normally can't operate. So physical agility is an important
parameter along with self-sustainability. The disadvantages of sandy, muddy, and
swampy terrain conditions for the mobility of most current vehicles are generally
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compensated by the Iguana 's design. The amphibious ability of Iguana™ enables it to
perform fording operations easily. This mobility versatility with the high detection
means gives it superior battlefield surveillance and domination abilities in an
unprecedented set of geographic locations and climatic conditions. Iguana™ must have
proper design and necessary tools for the transportability on roads with the wheeled
transporters for the long ranges. Depending on the future heavy-lift helicopters' lifting
capacity, the transportability with heavy-lift helicopters across battlefield arena can
increase the operational flexibility largely. Iguana™ mobility components include
transmission, engine, suspension, tracks, wheels, and fuels and lubricants. The use of
several advanced component systems such as band track, semiactive suspension with an
active track tensioner, and electric drives improve tactical mobility. Iguana™ 's hybrid
electric drive will improve fuel economy. The continuous band tracks will be developed
for vehicles as heavy as 25 tons, providing the enhanced on/off road mobility through
reduced ground pressure, better traction and lateral stability; reduced platform vibration,
noise, radar/acoustic signatures, weight, and rolling resistance; improved track life;
corrosion and maintenance-free operations; and lower life cycle costs. [Ref. 6] Its nitrile
rubber based track material will satisfy long service time requirements. There are still
design problems in changing the continuous band track in field conditions by the crew.
Otherwise, the traditional track design with some modifications can be used for Iguana™
while it is a mandatory selection for main battle tanks because of the gross vehicle
weight. The front drives sprockets engage with rubber-bushed, double pin tracks that can
be up to 50 cm wide and have links with two replaceable road pads each. They are the
new generation tracks with sprocket engagement into the track link bodies instead of end
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connectors. As a result of the latter they are no longer subject to wear, which is confined
to the link bodies, and the track retains in full its functional characteristics to the end of
its working life. Semiactive suspension will be developed incorporating a track
tensioning system that will provide improved fuel economy and better track retention.
The increased number of road wheels will increase the length of the track in contact with
the ground, and consequently reduce the nominal ground pressure (NGP). More
importantly, it will reduce the peaks of the ground pressure which occur under the road
wheels and which govern, to a large extent, performance on the soft ground. Active noise
and vibration control will minimize the noise signature and vibration signature as well as
the crew fatigue. Composite armor and hybrid electric drive will also significantly
enhance the noise and vibration control performance. The reduced dust signature of
Iguana™ due to the side skirts will contribute to its stealth operation performance. The
Iguana™ must be able to autonomously and quickly detect and breach or bypass
minefields. So a dozer blade (interchangeable with mine plough) can enhance its
mobility performance.
Iguana™ must fulfill all of the Operation Requirement Document mobility
specifications in the section Dl of the chapter V. In addition to this, the long-term
service and RAM (Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability) tests shall be conducted
in the realistic operational conditions. Moreover, NATO Reference Mobility Model in
the virtual environment can be helpful to determine the Iguana™ mobility performance
by providing valuable feedback for the mobility components design. The NATO
Reference Mobility Model (NRMM) is a computer code used to predict the steady-state
operating capability of a given vehicle in a prescribed terrain. NRMM determines the
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maximum possible speeds versus resisting force relation of the driving elements for
vehicle considering its power-train capability. The model then predicts various
impediments to vehicle motion as a function of specific terrain factors.(Ref. 7)
Unfortunately, The NRMM does not at this time contain a model of the Iguana vehicle.
The input data for the model are segregated into vehicle, terrain, and "scenario"
data. The vehicle data describe various physical aspects in engineering terms such as the
power train, surface traction elements, sizes, weights, geometry, etc., of the vehicle. The
terrain data describe in engineering terms various physical aspects such as soil properties,
slope, vegetation, macro- and microgeometry, etc. "Scenario" data consist of generic
vehicle and terrain data that are dependent of a specific terrain or vehicle and remain
constant for a model execution. Examples of "scenario" data include the driver's reaction
time, weather conditions, climatic conditions, vegetation avoid/override strategy, etc.
[Ref. 7]
Iguana™ will present an integrated mobility concept by optimizing or surpassing
both wheeled and tracked vehicle advantages. The "Mobility Assessment of Marine
Corps Wheeled and Tracked Vehicles Using the Stochastic NATO Reference Mobility
Model" is a technical report from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment
Station also emphasizes this urgent mobility requirement for various geographic regions
like Kuwait, Philippines and South Korea. The wheeled vehicle's lower levels of
vibration and noise which makes them less fatiguing for their occupants can be achieved
in Iguana™ armored vehicle family by using the composite armor and hybrid electric
drive technologies. When wheeled vehicles use road routes, they consume half the
amount of fuel, which reduces the logistics support they require. Iguana™ will also
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consume less fuel because of the lightweight composite armor and efficient hybrid
electric drive. The amount of terrain, upon which wheeled vehicles, can operate off the
road, is less than that of tracked vehicles and decreases significantly with increasing
weight. Even if tracked vehicles have superior mobility compared wheeled vehicles on
the cross-country drive, they still have serious problems under certain adverse terrain
conditions like muddy, rocky, steep and dense vegetation grounds. By comparison the
Iguana™ mobility components enable it to operate beyond the current tracked vehicles'
operation arena. Iguana™' s higher acceleration capacity, unique trailer design with
hydraulic connection mechanism, modular maintenance simplicity, superior obstacle
passing ability and all-weather driver visibility equipment consolidate its tactical mobility
superiority.
The current dimensions of Iguana™ are extendable proportionally to answer
different operational roles, for example, Model was designed for a 2,000 pound payload
yet could be scaled up or down to handle larger or smaller payloads. The Iguana's design
is open to new modifications and evolving automotive technology continues to expand
the range of Iguana™ subsystems available without initiation of major development
programs. For example, a new version of the Iguana™ prototype is projected that can
disconnect its trailer temporarily. Another important contributor to Iguana™ mobility
performance is its use of all of the four possible forward propulsion methods to achieve
the desired agility. These are:
1. applying traction
2. using prior gained momentum
3. pumping material backward
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4. using hydraulic articulation as a leverage
In May 15 1999, trials of the modified version of first Iguana™ prototype were




Figure 5. Iguana front axle can rotate 15 degree
,TM
Figure 6. Iguana tracks have cone grousers for better traction
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Figure 7. Ditch passing with the help of the hydraulic controlled trailer
Figure 8. Ditch passing with the help of the hydraulic controlled trailer
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Figure 10. Hydraulic connection mechanism for trailer
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Figure 12. Hydraulic connection mechanism provides an altitude adjustment ability for
obstacle crossing
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X. SECOND GENERATION THERMAL IMAGING DEVICE
PERFORMANCE TEST
A thermal imaging sensor detects the arrival of IR energy, electronically
processes the detected energy, and presents the results for display. The FLIR92 and
Acquire computer programs, which are thermal imaging system performance assessment
programs, were developed by U.S. Army Night Vision & Electronic Sensors Directorate
at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. FLIR92 is used to calculate the modulation transfer function
(MTF) and minimum resolvable temperature difference (MRT) curves for first-, second-
and third-generation thermal imaging sensors. Acquire is used to generate estimates of
the probability of detection, recognition, and identification as a function of target range
using the output from FLIR92 as an input. The FLIR92 user specifies system elements
(optics, scanner, stabilization, detector, electronic filters, display, etc.) and inputs
component parameter values for each element. The computer code calculates the MTF
using theoretical and/or semi-empirical MTF functions for each element. It then uses the
Ratches model to calculate MRT curves from the MTFs. The Acquire user specifies
target characteristics and atmospheric extinction coefficients. The Ratches model is then
used in conjunction with Johnson's criteria to calculate the probabilities at various ranges
[Ref. 8]. Phenomena incorporated in the code are:
1. Diffraction








9. Visual perception characteristics
10. Detector wavelength response
The specifications of a generic second generation thermal imaging system that
were input to FLIR92 program can be found in appendix A as well as the resultant MRT
curve results. Basically, the generic thermal imager possessed 8-12 tim spectral response
with a 960x4-element detector (4 element time-delay-and-integration) and a 30 cm
diameter aperture. The ACQUIRE input files with different atmospheric transmission
coefficients found in Appendix A are:
1. For the 2.3 x 2.3 meter standard tank target with 1.25 Kelvin apparent
temperature difference
2. For the 0.5 x 0.5 meter standard human target with 16.5 Kelvin apparent
temperature difference
The 95% detection and recognition probabilities as a function of atmospheric
transmission coefficients and the target detection and recognition ranges are displayed in
the Figure 13 and Figure 14 respectively. According to our Iguana™ operational
requirement document, the sensor system must have a 95% probability of detection and
recognition standard in the 1 dB/km atmospheric attenuation condition (79% transmission
per kilometer). It must meet the following target range requirements:
1. For tank, APC, & helicopter type targets the detection range must be 10 km
and recognition ranges must be 3.8 km, and
2. For personnel targets, the detection range must be 4.8 km with a 1.24 km
recognition range.
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Thus, from our analysis of this sensor, its characteristics meet the requirements of
the Operational Requirements Document. The figures also show that 95% percent
detection and recognition probabilities' ranges for the different atmospheric transmission
coefficients can be interpreted operationally as showing the major dependence of IR
detection range on weather conditions. In a similar way, calculations can be made for
any other proposed thermal imaging system's performance by changing FLIR92 and
ACQUIRE input parameters relative to the new sensor system component characteristics.
FLER.92 input file parameters in Appendix A were chosen to optimize detection and
recognition ranges for a realistic second generation thermal imaging device.
Atmospheric transmission coefficient which is a selectable value in the Figure 13
and 14 can be calculated for specific atmospheric conditions by using LOWTRAN 7,
MODTRAN and FASCOD 3 computer models. These computer models have variable
sets of regional environmental conditions in order to facilitate global atmospheric
attenuation coefficient calculations. LOWTRAN 7 model is designed for low resolution
(>20 cm" 1 ) atmospheric transmission & radiance analyses. MODTRAN, which offers
ten-fold resolution enhancement and better temperature and pressure dependence than
LOWTRAN, is designed for medium resolution (>2 cm" 1 ) atmospheric transmission &
radiance analyses. FASCOD3 is designed for laser transmission and/or high-resolution
transmittance and radiance (except scattered solar radiance) analyses. It uses line-by-line
calculation with contributions from Voigt lineshapes with centers up to 25 cm" 1 distant
for wavelengths.
The apparent temperature difference between target and background in the
ACQUIRE input program depends on the actual temperature difference between target
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and background, and on the emissivity parameters which are functions of wavelength for
both target and background. For example, human skin emissivity value is about 0.98.
The global background emissivity values can be obtained from the
http://tanalo.larc.nasa.gov: 8080/surf_htmls/ems_bb website. Lowtran computer models
are also used for apparent temperature difference calculations in detail by using these
target and background emissivity values. In the ACQUIRE thermal imaging device
performance assessment, the apparent temperature difference between human body
temperature (309.5 K) and background (293 K) is taken as 16.5 Kelvin. The 293 K
background temperature represents the highest summer night background temperature
along Turkish-Iraqi border. The 0.5 meter square exposed area is an appropriate average
area for human target when the clothes' effect on the detectable temperature difference
and the partial exposed human body area in the combat conditions are taken into
consideration. It is assumed that the apparent 1.25 K temperature difference between the
tank, APC or helicopter and background is a good average value for total surface area. A
characteristic target dimension given by the geometric mean of the target's horizontal and
vertical dimensions. The 2.3 meters square exposing area for these targets is acceptable
as a worst case sensor orientation toward these targets. 1.25 K for 2.3 m x 2.3 m area is a
commonly used standard (tank target signature) in thermal imaging performance analysis.
Johnson's criteria were obtained from a series of psychophysical experiments on
perception of image intensifier images when targets were placed at different ranges in a
benign terrain context and viewed with an image intensifier by a large number of
observers. However, Johnson's criteria are used in slightly modified format in current
versions of imaging system performance codes. For 50% probability, the number of
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cycles is assumed to be 0.75 for detection and 3.0 for recognition in the ACQUIRE input
file. The classification and identification probabilities as a function of range can
similarly be calculated by taking the number of cycles of the 50% probability as 1.5 for
classification and 6.0 for identification. The 95% probability values needed for
comparison with the ORD can be read directly from the Acquire output files.
The blackbody radiation curves in figure 15 shows how the peak radiation
wavelength changes with the changing temperature for different blackbody temperatures.
So the radiation collected by a sensor that operates at a certain wavelength window will
be affected by the emissivity values and actual temperature difference between target and
background. The radiation arriving at a sensor after crossing through the atmosphere will
consist of the background, reflected sky, and path radiance plus that of the target and will
be reduced by atmospheric attenuation. [Figure 16]
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95 % detection and recognation probability ranges at 16.5 K temperature difference for the 0.5 x 0.5 standard human target
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Figure 13. %95 detection and recognition probability ranges at 16.5 K temperature
difference for the 0.5 x 0.5 standard human target





Figure 14. %95 detection and recognition probability ranges at 1.25 K temperature
































Figure 15. Blackbody Radiation Curves (from Prof. Harney SE 3003 class notes)
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We have derived the operational requirements for a reconnaissance, forward
observer and anti-guerrilla version of an armored vehicle. These requirements generally
stipulate that common weapon, surveillance, mobility, armor, stealth, digital
infrastructure, survivability, and drive system characteristics are desired in the design of
these vehicles to meet the tactical requirements of the future combat missions and
simplify logistic support. Scenarios and functional flows methods were used to analyze,
for each version of the armored vehicle, the operational need. The purpose of this thesis
is to conceive of modern armored vehicle created from an integrated combat system and
high mobility vehicle exploiting innovative technologies. The composite armor,
integrated weapon system, hybrid electric drive, digital C3I (command, control,
communication and intelligence) system, active protection system and integrated sensor
technologies all carried on a novel tracked vehicle will offer profound new tactical
advantages over armored vehicles currently in service.
A modular and reconfigurable armored vehicle that integrates multiple
advanced sensor components including a second-generation thermal imaging sensor, a
millimeter wave (MMW) radar with moving target identification (MTI) capability, a
daylight television, a multifunction laser (with rangefinding, laser designating, and high-
density profiling modes), and acoustic arrays can satisfy current battlefield target
acquisition and surveillance requirements. The thermal imaging sensor will operate at'
high frame rates allowing sniper and mortar detection in addition to the conventional
target acquisition functions. Integration of a multifunction multi-wavelength laser system
will incorporate ranging, range mapping, laser designation, and target profiling to support
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target location, target cueing, target designation, and aided target identification. The
acoustic array will provide target cueing and location and will facilitate automated
targeting functions. The precise configuration of the armored vehicle's sensor suite will
heavily depend on the required detection, recognition and identification probabilities at
different ranges in the predetermined atmospheric conditions and on what the user can
afford. This sensor platform will provide scout/cavalry, anti-guerrilla and forward
observer vehicles with a compact, affordable sensor suite for long-range uncooperative
target identification, mortar/sniper fire location, and air defense against low flying
targets.
Future armored vehicles will have combined active and passive protection
systems. Some components of this system will be the laser and radar warning devices,
multispectral smoke rounds, laser jamming devices, IR suppression system and IR decoys
rounds. When the active protection system is turned on, it will execute its functions in
automatic mode. It will track incoming rounds, ignoring incoming rounds until they are
within certain range, then engaging anything approaching at the certain speed interval
like 80-800 m/sec. The false targets, such as outgoing rounds, near misses, birds and
small projectiles (like splinters or bullets) would be ignored. Active protection system
rounds will be fired from the threat-side launcher for the incoming warhead and they will
detonate it at a standoff distance that provides survivability.
Hybrid electric drive and composite armor technologies provide low thermal and
acoustic signatures for armored vehicles. Composite armor is lighter than conventional
armor, so it has a positive effect on the agility of armored vehicle. Hybrid electric drive
also enhances the acceleration ability of armored vehicle in addition to its fuel economy
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features. Composite armor with the ceramic layers and modular explosive reactive armor
is highly penetration resistant while it has reduced spalling spray area and no corrosion
problem. The higher insulation feature of composite armor against harsh climate
conditions will increase the crew protection and performance. The ability to sneak up on
an adversary through the use of lower noise and electromagnetic signatures when using
battery power as well as the flexibility of the design configuration are the other
advantages of the hybrid electric drive.
The digitization of the Iguana™ will facilitate improvement of C3I functions for
the vehicle commanders by providing timely and secure information dissemination and
thereby keep the commanders in the information warfare game. Digitization offers the
capability of simultaneous data, voice and imagery communications on multiple nets
supporting reliable internal communication. This will contribute to coherent operations
with other tactical elements. The global positioning system (GPS) navigation readout,
tactical liquid crystal displays (LCD), sensor television displays, very high frequency
(VHF) radios, frequency hopping radios and IFF system are some components of the
digital infrastructure. Other digitized functions include digital mapping, navigation/
positioning, graphic/alphanumeric messages, tactical situation reports, automatic
updating overlays, logistic reports and communication network management.
The armament system of Iguana™ will have a modular design which permit the
requirements of the different versions of Iguana™ to be realized without major
reengineering. A stabilized 40-mm medium caliber automatic gun that can fire the
discarding sabot projectiles in addition to the conventional projectiles will be the main
armament for Iguana™ along with a 7.62-mm co-axial machine gun. Its expended cases
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will be ejected outside while it has constant velocity feed for smooth and safe operation.
Anti-tank guided missile launchers, which can be added to the basic design, will give
Iguana™ the extra firepower for the strike force missions.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the author's conceptual design for Future Scout
and Cavalry System (FSCS). This design has many common subsystem characteristics
with Iguana™. So it provides useful clues for the detailed technical design of Iguana™.
Appendix B proposes a complete performance test plan, in phases, for an armored
vehicle. Such a test plan provides a guide to designers of the expectations of the users
and allows for a dialog between designers and users.
Every combat subsystem of Iguana™ presents a new thesis topic for future
Studies which would elaborate the design and refine the requirements. The trade-off
analyses can be expanded for each subsystem components in order to optimize the
integrated engineering design and total system cost. Each subsystem mission timelines
must be prepared to assure minimum response time and synchronization among
subsystems. The detailed threat analysis for future battle space must be reviewed in the
face of advancing technologies. The schematic block diagrams of the components can be
conceived by extracting from the functional flow description provided here the design
requirements for those components and from the system architecture. These schematic
descriptions are a precursor to the detail engineering design diagrams. To achieve the
sought after higher system performance, the performance of the crew and other system
components must be understood. For example, crew training in the use of the IR system
is necessary to realize the detection and identification criteria specified by Johnson.
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Thus, the integration study must deal with training issues and what is required to achieve
the needed level of performance.
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Figure 17. The first drawing of an independent FSCS conceptual design (from ARMOR
magazine (January/February 1999))
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Figure 18. The second drawing of an independent FSCS conceptual design (from
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APPENDIX A. FLIR92 AND ACQUIRE INPUT/OUTPUT FILES
A.FLIR92 INPUT FILE






































































































horz_rms_motion_ampli tude 0.02 mrad
vert_rms_motion_ampli tude 0.02 mrad
>spectral_detectivity











B. FLIR92 OUTPUT FILE
U.S. Army CECOM NVESD FLIR92 Thu Mar 11 08:05:12 1999
output file: gen2 . 1 short listing
data file: gen2
command line arguments: -d gen2 -o gen2 -p MRT
begin data file listing . . .

































































































horz_rms_motion_ampli tude 0.02 mrad





















Using measured 3D noise components.
Diffraction wavelength set to spectral band midpoint
Fields-of -view calculated by model.



















parameter NETD @ 3 00 K NETD @ K noise bandwidth
white NETD 0.052 deg C 0.000 deg C 2.006e+004 Hz
classical NETD 0.054 deg C 0.000 deg C 2.147e+004 Hz




0.050 deg C 0.000 deg C
0.010 deg C 0.000 deg C
0.050 deg C 0.000 deg C
Planck integral
. . . w/D-star
1.978e-004 0.000e+000 W/ (cm*cm*K)
1.555e+007 0.000e+000 sqrt (Hz) / (cm*K)
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TOTAL HORIZONTAL MTFs
cy/mr H_SYS H_PRE H_TPF H_SPF
0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.500 0.856 0.912 1.000 0.939
3.000 0.678 0.785 1.000 0.864
4.500 0.496 0.637 0.999 0.778
6.000 0.335 0.488 0.999 0.687
7.500 0.209 0.352 0.998 0.594
9.000 0.120 0.238 0.997 0.503
10.500 0.063 0.152 0.996 0.418
12.000 0.031 0.091 0.995 0.340
13.500 0.014 0.051 0.993 0.271
15.000 0.006 0.026 0.992 0.211
16.500 0.002 0.013 0.990 0.161
18.000 0.001 0.006 0.988 0.121
19.500 0.000 0.002 0.986 0.088
21.000 0.000 0.001 0.984 0.063
22.500 0.000 0.000 0.981 0.045
24.000 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.031
25.500 0.000 0.000 0.976 0.021
27.000 0.000 0.000 0.974 0.014
28.500 0.000 0.000 0.971 0.009
30.000 0.000 0.000 0.968 0.000
L VERTICAL MTFs
cy/mr H_SYS H_PRE H_SPF
0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.500 0.857 0.912 0.940
3.000 0.681 0.786 0.867
4.500 0.502 0.639 0.785
6.000 0.342 0.490 0.698
7.500 0.216 0.354 0.610
9.000 0.126 0.241 0.523
10.500 0.068 0.154 0.440
12.000 0.033 0.092 0.363
13.500 0.015 0.052 0.295
15.000 0.006 0.027 0.234
16.500 0.002 0.013 0.183
18.000 0.001 0.006 0.141
19.500 0.000 0.002 0.106
21.000 0.000 0.001 0.078
22.500 0.000 0.000 0.057
24.000 0.000 0.000 0.041
25.500 0.000 0.000 0.028
27.000 0.000 0.000 0.019
28.500 0.000 0.000 0.013
30.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
PREFILTER VALUES AT NYQUIST



















MRTD AT 300 K BACKGROUND TEMPERATURE
cy/mr horz cy/mr vert cy,'mr 2D
0.05 1 .500 0.005 0.05 1,.500 0,.044 3 .219 0.044
0.10 3 .000 0.010 0.10 3 .000 .074 4 .193 0.058
0.15 4 .500 0.017 0.15 4 .500 .118 5 .093 0.078
0.20 6 .000 0.030 0.20 6 .000 .191 6 .025 0.103
0.25 7 .500 0.056 0.25 7 .500 .323 6 .884 0.137
0.30 9 .000 0.107 0.30 9 .000 .581 7 .701 0.183
0.35 10 .500 0.221 0.35 10 .500 1 .118 8 .455 0.243
0.40 12 .000 0.487 0.40 12 .000 2,.315 9 .178 0.324
0.45 13 .500 1.164 0.45 13 .500 5,.190 9 .844 0.431
0.50 15 .000 3.023 0.50 15,.000 12,.659 10 .493 0.574
0.55 16..500 8.583 0.55 16,.500 33,.776 11 .088 0.763
0.60 18 .000 26.847 0.60 18,.000 99,.254 11 .678 1.016
0.65 19,.500 93.373 0.65 19,.500 99,.999 12 .231 1.352
0.70 21..000 99.999 0.70 21..000 99,.999 12 .761 1.800
0.75 22,.500 1.122 0.75 22,.500 99,.999 13 .286 2.395
0.80 24 .000 5.966 0.80 24,.000 99,.999 13 .779 3.187
0.85 25,.500 39.983 0.85 25,.500 99,.999 14 .257 4.242
0.90 27,.000 99.999 0.90 27..000 99..999 14 .727 5.646
0.95 28,.500 99.999 0.95 28,.500 99..999 15 .176 7.514
1.00 30,.000 99.999 1.00 30,.000 99..999 15..617 10.000
FLIR92
.
. gen2 . 1: end of listing
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C. ACQUIRE INPUT FILE
gen2_t0.acq: ACQUIRE data file: FLIR92 vl : Tue Feb 02 10





Atmospheric Transmittance Smoke Mass Extinction
0.5000 0.0000
# MRTD :Data Points Cycle iCriterion #1
Criterion #2
20.0 0..7500
WFOV/NFOV Ratio WFOV: Cycle (Criterion #1
Criterion #2
0.0000 0. 0000
1-D Performance Flag Search Time
Range
0.0000 0. 0000







































U.S. Army CECOM Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics
E-0 Sensor Target Acquisition Model
ACQUIRE version 0, 31 May 1990
Date: 06/01/1999
Time: 2 052 hours
***********************************************************************
********
gen2_t0.acq: ACQUIRE data file
source data file: gen2
FLIR92 vl: Tue Feb 02 10:34:43 1993













.75 -N50 #1 3.00 -N50 #2
Subjective Resolution for NFOV
Freq Xmrt Ymrt 2D mrt
3 .219 .419E+01 .580E-01 .440E-01
5 .093 .603E+01 .103E+00 .780E-01
6 .884 .770E+01 .183E+00 .137E+00
8 .455 .918E+01 .324E+00 .243E+00
9 .844 .105E+02 .574E+00 .431E+00
11 .088 .117E+02 .102E+01 .763E+00
12 .231 .128E+02 .180E+01 .135E+01
13 .286 .138E+02 .319E+01 .239E+01
14 .257 .147E+02 .565E+01 .424E+01
15 .176 .156E+02 .100E+02 .751E+01
15 .226 .lOOE+ll .100E+11 .100E+11
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Field Performance based on both directions
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APPENDIX B. IGUANA™ TEST PLAN
The following field performance tests will be executed in a wide spectrum of




The mobility specifications that explain in the 4A section of the operation
requirement document (ORD) will be performed in the different ground characteristics
with the recovery exercise of Iguana™.
B. Surveillance Test
:
A possible combination of radar, acoustic, thermal night vision/image intensifier
and day sights will be checked in order to satisfy the ORD detection and recognition
requirements.
C. Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Functions Test
:
Radios, navigation devices, tactical displays, global positioning system (GPS),
North seeker, interface devices, video recording, secure data/voice/picture transfer,
electronic countermeasures will be checked.
D. Survivability Test
:
Mine blast test, NBC test, armor test against kinetic energy and shaped charge
rounds, fire suppression test will be executed. The warning systems (such as laser
warning device or chemical agent detector), active protection measures (such as laser




Firepower (missile, automatic canon, automatic grenade launcher, coaxial
machine gun and turret machine gun, multi-spectral smoke mortar, 60-mm on-board
mortar) will be evaluated at various ranges in live fire. The turret specifications, range
finding, stabilization system and fire control system performance will be checked.
F. Low Detection Signature Test
:
Radar, IR, acoustic, visible, seismic signatures will be checked in various
backgrounds under different weather conditions.
G. RAM (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability) Tests :
The long-term service trials in military units for a 6 months period will exhibit the
actual problems of the end users and provide a valuable feedback for designers. Engine




Air, sea, rail, trailer transportation types will be tried with airdrop operation.
I. Force-On-Force Scenarios Test
:
We can realistically evaluate the demanded characteristics of Iguana™ in the




The above performance tests will be executed with the current similar combat
vehicles in the same conditions.
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